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Public Accommodations: A Justification of
Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
I. INTRODUCTION
HISTORIANS have a penchant for depicting a period of social
or economic change with a dramatic, but empty, catch phrase
whereby the mind's eye can conveniently turn back to an allotted
cubby-hole in search of past events. The period of change in Negro-
white relations is no less deserving of description. Despite the
great social and economic changes that have occurred in the Ameri-
can past, such as the Agrarian Reform, the Populist Revolt, and the
New Deal,1 none can compare in impact, depth, or scope to the
Civil Rights movement. Since approximately 1954, the movement
has gone forward apace, but this social change has been under-
way from the time the first trader plucked the first slave from Africa.
And like a festering social sore, the problem of equality among
blacks and whites has only recently reached a head. Unlike "typi-
cal" social reforms possessed of a single goal such as prohibition and
greenbacks, the civil rights movement seeks broad "across the
board" changes in employment, housing, voting, public accommoda-
tions, education, and lastly in attitude. Legislation, pending and
passed, on national and local levels promises a degree of success for
the movants. In the final analysis, however, total acceptance of the
Negro into all facets of the white-dominated society will depend on
a basic change in prevailing thought. Perhaps several generations
will pass before significant progress will be experienced in develop-
ing a new attitude toward our non-white citizenry. Nonetheless, the
Civil Rights Act of 19642 has evoked some acceptance, albeit
penurious at this time. It is the object of this Note to treat in depth,
one segment of that legislation: public accommodations.3 In so do-
ing, an educative approach is adopted in the hope of providing a
-ratio decidendi for the previously uncommitted intellect. No pre-
tense is made with respect to convincing the emotionally biased and
the intellectually dishonest. That task is left to Newman's "Pulpit
and Parlor."4
1. HOFSTADER, THE AGE OF REFORM passim (1955).
2. 78 Stat. 241, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1971, 1975a-d, 2000a-a(6), 2000b-b(3), 2000c-
c(9), 2000d-d(4), 2000e-e(15), 2000f, 2000g-g(3), 2000h-h(6) (1964).
3. 78 Stat. 243; 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000a-a(6) (1964).
4. NEWMAN, THE IDEA OF A UNIVERSITY (1852).
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It is, perhaps, redundant to write an apologia for an act passed
and declared constitutional.5 Title II, however, of all the titles in
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, has produced the greatest amount of
controversy because of its intensely personal character. The segre-
gationist, no matter how rabid, should have little difficulty in spend-
ing eight hours with a Negro in a shop;' and no real problem should
be encountered in the area of public contracts.7 But to eat next to
a Negro or sleep in a bed occupied by a Negro the previous night
is personally repugnant to the racist; hence, the very strong feeling
pervading this area is evident. From a quasi-intellectual viewpoint,
Title I represents to its opponents a challenge to their conceived
notions of private property. State's righters observe that the entire
act is but another intrusion by the central government into an area
that ought to be state controlled. And, there are some who, in all
intellectual honesty, condemn Title II for its unconstitutional utiliza-
tion of the commerce clause.
In discussing these objections to the legislation and in an attempt
to proselytize, consideration will be given to the act itself, and rele-
vant legislative history, with a view toward interpretation. The
Court decisions respecting Tide II, a discussion of the nature of pri-
vate property, and Tide II vis-a-vis state public accommodation
laws will also be discussed.
II. BACKGROUND OF THE PROBLEM
Governmental activity in a given area is usually in response to
some real or imagined need. The public accommodations section
of the Civil Rights Act of 19648 is no exception to that general rule.
It is the thesis of this Note that the need to which Congress re-
sponded was real. The purpose of the act is variously stated in
sonorous tones,' however, congressional intent is in no wise nubilous.
5. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); Katzenbach
v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
6. 78 Star. 253, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e-e(15) (1964). For an in depth discussion of
this problem see Note, Employment Discrimination: State FEP Laws and the Impact of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, W. RES. L. REv. 608 (1965).
7. 78 Stat. 252,42 U.S.C.A. § 2000d-d(4) (1964).
8. 78 Stat. 243; 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000a-a(6) (1964).
9. For example, the Senate Commerce Committee stated that the object of Title II
was to vindicate "the deprivation of personal dignity that surely accompanies denials of
equal access to public establishments." S. Rep. No.. 872, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 16-17
(1964). The House Judiciary Committee Report states:
Another signpost of freedom must be extended to the Negro if he is to over-
come racial inequality and if our country is to live up to its national ideals.
This is the opportunity for every individual, regardless of the color of his skin
to have access to places of public accommodations. This right is so distinctive
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The nationwide denial of access to Negroes in places of public ac-
commodation is a fact that needs no documentation. And, that this
denial is morally wrong ought to need no documentation. Never-
theless, a substantial number of people will deny that proposition
and substitute, instead, an affirmative right of private property and
freedom of association.'0 Of course, it is always wiser to oppose in
an affirmative fashion, and, in this instance, to cloy about the loss of
personal freedom. Nevertheless, Congress responded to vocal and
sometimes violent demonstrations1 as well as to a variety of social,
economic and diplomatic problems.
A. Diplomatic Problems
Discriminatory practices affecting black citizens of this country
subjects the individual involved to humiliation and insult. The ef-
fect of these domestic practices not only affects the individual but,
in an ancillary fashion, tarnishes the projected image of the United
States. One cannot expect an American diplomat to eulogize with
"tongue-in-cheek" the equality of opportunity in this nation to a Rho-
desian when, de facto, Negroes are denied entrance to an American
restaurant. Perhaps this fakery could have been practiced a half-
century ago. But with the advent of mass communication, there is
little one does not know about a foreign land, even in Rhodesia.
Moreover, the situation becomes politically indefensible when a
black diplomat is denied access to a hotel, restaurant or theater."
Enmity in those cases is not only felt for the proprietors of the
establishments, but also for the United States in general. 3 While
in its nature that its denial constitutes a shocking refutation of a free society.
BUREAU OF NAT'L AFFAIRS, THE CIVIL RIGHTS AcT OF 1964, at 262
(1964).
In marked contrast is an entirely different approach to Title II taken by an opponent.
"[it is by far the most iniquitous and unconstitutional part of the whole bill." Simp-
son, The Public Accommodations Section of the Civil Rights Bill, 25 ALI.. LAWYER
305 (1964).
10. Simpson, op. cit. supra note 9, at 308.
11. U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1727 (July 20, 1964).
The purpose of S. 1732 is to achieve a peaceful and voluntary settlement of
the persistent problem of racial... discrimination or segregation by estab-
lishments doing business with the general public.. . . Ibid.
12. BUREAU OF NAT'L AFFAIRS, op. cit. supra note 9, at 262.
13. Ibid.
Our nation is engaged today in cold war combat with an alien ideology. On
every front - military, economic, political, and social - we must demonstrate
the worth of our system. To do this, we need every ally we can obtain.
Therefore, when representatives of other nations meet enmity and rejection
from operators of public establishments on our soil, they carry away feelings of
enmity and rejection themselves. The result of this cannot but undermine
our foreign policy. Ibid.
[Vol. 16:660
Public Accommodations
legislation of whatever sort will not minimize or erase ill feeling to-
ward the Negro, Tide II can suppress blatant hostility.
B. Social Problems
The social ramifications of a diseased system are detailed in mi-
numerable sources and need no documentation here. However, the
civil rights' planks of both major parties in the presidential campaign
of 1960 are relevant to this discussion. In that year the Republican
and Democratic conventions took the position that racial discrimina-
tion should be eliminated. 4 The late President John F. Kennedy
characterized discrimination in public accommodations as a "daily
insult."'" He further noted that "it should not be necessary for any
American citizen to demonstrate in the streets for the opportunity"'"
to enjoy the full facilities of any so-called public accommodation.
Particularly tragic 'is the immobility of Negroes with respect to
normal travel. No earthly reason can be conjured up why a Negro,
on a vacation, must stretch his endurance to limits unnecessary for
whites in search of acceptable accommodations.'" And then, what
of Negro children? In what manner does a Negro adult inform his
child that the child's needs cannot be catered to when those needs
arise? It does not tax the mind to imagine the bitterness that wells
up when one must inform a child that he cannot use a filling sta-
tion's restroom or that buying an ice cream cone is an impossibility
in a particular locale.'" But it would be a gross understatement to
object to discrimination on the basis of a dean bed or an ice cream
cone; these outward marks of a fatuous system only serve to under-
score the affront to the dignity of a substantial segment of our
populace.
14. U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. Naws 1734-35 (July 20, 1964).
15. Id. at 1735.
16. Ibid.
17. The following material was presented to the House Judiciary Committee by an
official of thq NAACP.
For millions of Americans this is vacation time. Swarms of families load
their automobiles and trek across country. I invite the members of this com-
mittee to imagine themselves darker in color and to plan an auto trip...
[through Southern States].
How far do you drive each day? Where and under what conditions can
you and your family eat? Where can they use a restroom? Can you stop
driving after a reasonable day behind the wheel or must you drive until you
reach 'a city where relatives or friends will accommodate you and yours for
the night? Will your children be denied a soft drink or an ice cream cone
because they are not white? BUREAU OF NA'L AFFAIRs, op. cit. supra note
9, at 262.
18. Ibid.
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C. Economic Problems
The societal aspects of discriminatory practices ought to be
enough to warrant and justify passage of Title II, yet there are eco-
nomic reasons which serve to add to the senselessness of discrimina-
tion. Initially, it is impossible to calculate the dollars lost to local
business communities simply because of segregation. Negroes who
have habitually been denied access to public accommodations and
those who are aware of the uncertainties of travel are reluctant to
take to the road during vacation time." That many communities
depend to a great extent on tourist dollars is well known. Integra-
tion of hotel facilities provides additional income for cities that
would not be the recipients of convention and vacation business but
for desegregation. For example, the Dallas Chamber of Commerce
reported in 1963 that integration in that city has added eight to ten
million dollars in convention business.2" After Atlanta, Georgia,
hotels announced an open door policy with respect to race, three
conventions promising about 3,000 delegates committed their re-
spective organizations to meet in that city.2 '
Conversely, racial strife has produced downward trends in busi-
ness activity. The opponents of Title II argue that the blame for
demonstrations and violence and the consequent economic loss lies
at the doorstep of Title II's proponents. But they argue speciously
because demonstrations and racial strife in general occur not because
of the activity of the advocates of social change. Culpability is
19. In order to illustrate the burden segregation places upon the Negro, the following
chart indicates the distances that must be traversed in search of reasonable accommoda-
tions open to Negroes. If X, a Negro, were to go by car from Washington, D. C. to
New Orleans, Louisiana, he would travel a total of 1217 miles.
Washington, D. C. to Petersburg, Va. -------------------- 135 miles*
Petersburg to Raleigh, N. C. ------------------------- 150
Raleigh to Columbia, S. C. --------------------------- 185
Columbia to Atlanta, Ga. ---------------------------- 215
Atlanta to Tuskegee Inst., Ala. ------------------------ 134
Tuskegee Inst. to Mobile, Ala. ------------------------ 250
Mobile to New Orleans, La. -------------------------- 148
Total mileage ------------------------------------ 1217
*Average mileage between stops ----------------------- 174
Y, a white man, may decide to tour the Southland in a leisurely fashion and stop for
the night wherever and whenever he pleases. Yet X is prohibited from proceeding on
a similar plan. Y may stop driving after fifty miles; X must drive an average of 174
miles per day to reach the same destination. See note 18, supra.
20. U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1743 (July 20, 1964).
21. Ibid.
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entirely the burden of those who promote, counsel and participate
in the denial of equal facilities. 2
Prior to demonstrations in Little Rock, Arkansas, industrial in-
vestments in that state for a two year period totaled 248 million dol-
lars. In that same period, Little Rock added 10 new tacrories em-
ploying over one thousand new workers. However, after the vio-
lence in that city no new plants located in the area for two years
after the strife. Simultaneously, the state of Arkansas experienced
a 25 per cent decline in investments.23 After the bomb blast that
killed four Negro children in 1963, the Birmingham, Alabama
Chamber of Commerce reported no new industrial commitments for
the entire summer of 1963.24 In that same city for the same period
retail sales dropped 30 per cent.24 The University Medical Center
in Little Rock and the Universities of Mississippi and Alabama have
reported extreme difficulty in securing qualified personnel. During
1960 and 1961, business sales fell 50 per cent in Savannah,
Georgia."
It would seem fair to conclude on the basis of the above cited
statistics that segregation and concomitant demonstrations produce
a significant drag on local business sales, investment, and hiring
practices. Thus, adverse social, economic and diplomatic conditions
require that remedial action be taken. Once these conditions are
posited, logic requires that the question of who shall undertake the
task of change be answered.
III. NECESSITY FOR FEDERAL ACTION
The proponents of federal civil rights legislation are fond of
alluding to the nearly one hundred years that have passed since the
Emancipation Proclamation wherein Mr. Lincoln freed the slaves.
22. An analogous situation is present in the air corridor from West Germany to West
Berlin. The air lane, by treaty, is open to Allied commercial and military aircraft.
When the Soviets interfere or attempt to foreclose access to Berlin via the air route,
this nation traditionally ignores threats and fully utilizes its treaty rights. The Soviets
then charge the United States with dangerous practices, when this country is merely re-
affirming its right of use. Thus the blame for strife cannot be placed upon the United
States, but, on the other hand, on the Soviets for interference. The situation with
respect to demonstrations, sit-ins, parades and the like is an affirmation of a pre-existing
right. Those who seek to interfere with that right are responsible for any ensuing
melee. Naturally, the objectors will argue that no right of access pre-exists. But how
is that situation any different from the Soviet denials of Allied prerogatives?
23. U.S. CODE CONG. & Ai. Nnws 1744 (July 20, 1964).
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid.
26. BUREAU OF NAT'L AFFAIRs, op. cit. supra note 9, at 267.
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In that period, social gains for Negroes have been grudgingly won
and concessions have been niggardly. That the point is time-worn
and over-used does not detract from its validity and vitality. For
too long this country has indulged in the mistaken notions that:
(1) there is nothing wrong with segregation; (2) there is nothing
wrong with separate but equal; (3) if there is something evil about
segregation, then it can be dealt with in the day to day relations of
individuals; and (4) failing corrective treatment in this respect,
state governments are well-equipped to deal with the issue. The
reasonable protagonists for equal treatment would not deny that
states are clothed with sufficient power to deal with the problem of
segregation. But because a state has the power to act, does not carry
with it the disposition to act. In fact, only thirty-two states have
been so disposed.27 And, in those states which have enacted pub-
lic accommodation laws, few of those laws extend, for one reason
or another, to all establishments that conduct a "public" business.
Even within the same state, the statute is conflictingly construed. For
example, Ohio enacted a fairly comprehensive public accommoda-
tions law in 1884.28 In 1912, admittedly an early date, two similar
cases were decided by two different courts in two different ways. In
one case, a Negro plaintiff was denied service in an ice cream parlor.
The court held that, although the Ohio statute did not specifically
mention ice cream parlors, it was reasonable to conclude that the
parlor was similar to the mentioned eating establishments. There-
fore, the defendant had, under the statute, wronged the plaintiff by
refusing to serve him.29 However, one hundred and fifty miles away
in the same state and at the same judicial level, a candy store with
an adjacent soda fountain was likened to a hardware store (not men-
tioned in the statute) as opposed to an eating house."0 Thus, the
27. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
28. OHIO REV. CODE S§ 2901.35, .36.
29. Fowler v. Benner, 13 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 313 (C.P. 1912).
30. Deuwell . Foerster, 12 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 329 (C.P. 1912). The mythological
reasoning of the Duewell court is worth reading. After referring to mentioned estab-
lishments the court noted:
The idea was, and is, that all classes of people at some time or other will
need the services of the proprietors of such places and instrumentalities. They
hold themselves out for the service of everybody alike. The service in such
places and instrumentalities is wholly unlike the service of a candy store or
a soda fountain, or a hardware store, and the like. It is not everyhody that
has a taste or desire for candy or soda water. This comparison shows the
material distinction between the two classes of business, the one being clearly
public, and the other being clearly private and individual. Id. at 330. (Em-
phasis added.)
And the later additions [to the statute] of hotels, eating houses and barber
[VOL. 16:660
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defendant was entirely justified in refusing to serve the colored plain-
tiff. The problem of consistency in approach and resolution is not
indigenous to Ohio, but is typical of public accommodation sections
and court decisions in all states. One state may not list a barbershop
as a place of public accommodation,3 while another will include
barbershops but not public bath houses.32 Despite the worthy
intent of the various state legislatures in enacting these laws, they
obviously do not cover the spectrum. Thus, a Negro, able to enter
a barbershop in Ohio, may be rebuffed in a similar establishment in
Pennsylvania where he may enter a public bath that he may not be
able to enter in Wisconsin." The example illustrates that although
some states may be favorably disposed toward full integration of
public accommodations, uniformity of result is non-existent.
At least eighteen states have indicated, for one reason or another,
no disposition to exercise the power they admittedly possess. In
fact, some states have demonstrated a disposition to act in a nega-
tive fashion. Mississippi, for example, under the guise of a trespass
statute, has underscored with its mantle of authority segregation in
places of public accommodation. The statute authorizes anyone en-
gaged in a public business or trade to choose or select the persons
with whom the individual wishes to conduct business.34 In discuss-
ing the Mississippi statute and laying down guidelines for future
conduct, it is not meant to preclude merchants from dealing alike
with all potential customers. Thus, if an inadequately clothed per-
son attempted to secure admission to a better class restaurant or
hotel, the proprietor should be empowered to reject that person's
patronage. For instance, some eating houses require that male
diners wear neckties. If the rule of the house is "no necktie, no admis-
sion," then the manager should be permitted to eject non-conform-
ing males whether white or Negro. But a law akin to the Mississippi
statute is too broad in that it permits and even encourages discrimina-
tory treatment.
shops are much more analogous to hotels and public conveyances so far as
their duties toward the public than is a soda fountain or a dry goods store or
a hardware store. Id. at 331-32.
31. PENN. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4654 (1963).
32. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 942.04 (1958). This is not to say that Wisconsin permits
discrimination in public bath houses; but merely illustrates that failure to specifically
designate a place of accommodation or amusement may later produce conflicting judi-
cial interpretations.
33. The states utilized in the textual example may require integration by judicial con-
struction. The states are referred to because their respective statutes are silent in a
particular area.
34. Miss. CODE ANN. § 2046.5 (1957).
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Assuming therefore that discrimination is an evil, the necessity
for federal intervention to the degree permitted by the Constitution
is clear. Some states have no public accommodation laws, and some
have extended state authority in support of discrimination. Even in
states favorably disposed toward such laws, unanimity is non-existent
among sister states. In some instances, courts of the same state
have interpreted the accommodation statute in a different fashion.
While this situation is not wholly unique to antidiscrimination laws
and extends into other areas of the law, there is a clear need in this
instance for uniformity. Trust law, commercial law, contract law,
and the like are not insulated from the problem of consistency, but
are devoid of the sense of urgency that pervades this question. Those
areas of the law, while important to individuals, do not carry with
them the affront to human dignity 5 present in the instant situation.
Since states have been unable or unwilling to satisfactorily resolve
the knotty problems of societal harmony in race relations, it is
proper for the federal government to act in order to ensure, to con-
stitutional limitations, equal access for all citizens to places of public
accommodation.
IV. TITLE II
A. Legislative History
In February, 1963, President John Kennedy recommended to
Congress the passage of an act that would guarantee civil rights
to all American citizens."0 Following that message, a number of
bills were introduced and duly subjected to the mysterious machina-
tions which only a seasoned member of Congress can fathom. Al-
though largely irrelevant to this discussion, a hue and cry was raised
with respect to alleged "railroading" of the Civil Rights Act of
1964." Clearly, the integrity of the legislative process should be
preserved unimpaired, regardless of the matter before the Congress.
It will not do, in the name of equality and justice, to substitute a
tyranny of the majority for discrimination upon a minority. The com-
mon good does not, and cannot, consist of the greatest good of the
greatest number but in the greatest good to each individual in so-
35. U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1741 (July 20, 1964).
36. H.R. Doc. No. 75, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963).
37. U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1803-52 (July 20, 1964). For instance, one
minority report protests:
If such procedural departures and parliamentary irregularities are counte-
nanced in the future, then the committee system as a functional part of tradi-
tional legislative mechanics has expired. Id. at 1834.
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ciety. But the Court, in two opinions related to the act, did not see
fit to comment on minority charges.3" Since the act is now a fact,
investigation of the process is worthless.
B. Congressional Intent
The House Committee on Commerce indicated that the purpose
of the act was to peaceably and voluntarily resolve the inescapable
and seemingly endless web of racial discrimination."9 The House
Committee on the Judiciary prefaced its report indicating that the
purpose of the legislation was to ensure and protect civil rights, and
to enforce those rights throughout the land.4" Conversely, certain
members of Congress characterized this legislation as government
by injunction;4 an expansion of federal power to the point of anni-
hilating existing state boundaries;4" destructive of the civil rights
of all citizens;43 and an inordinate extension of the Attorney Gen-
eral's power.44 But despite fanciful or derogatory phraseology, the
act itself simply states in the preamble that Title II is designed "to
provide injunctive relief against discrimination in Public Accommo-
dations."45
C. The Act
The Civil Rights Act is divided into eleven titles, only one of
which is relevant here - Title II. This tide purports to prohibit
discrimination in places of public accommodation that are constitu-
tionally amenable to congressional power. Title II is divided into
seven sections. The first three sections contain declarations of
substantive rights, " while the remaining sections consider remedial
action.47
38. Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v.
United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
39. U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1727 (July 20, 1964).
40. Id. at 1763.
41. Id. at 1787.
42. Id. at 1791.
43. Id. at 1805.
44. Id. at 1804.
45. The Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Star. 241, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1971, 1975a-d,
2000a-a(6), 2000b-b(3), 2000c-c(9), 2000d-d(4), 2000e-e(15), 2000e, 2000f,
2000g-g(3), 2000h-h(6).
46. 78 Star. 243-44, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000a-a(1) (1964).
47. 78 Star. 244, 42 U.S.C.A. 2000a(2)-a(6) (1964).
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D. Prohibited Discrimination
Section 201(a)48 not only prohibits denials of service to Ne-
groes in places of public accommodation but guarantees full and
equal access to all goods and services of covered establishments. It
would seem, therefore, that section 201 (a) 4" would not only pro-
hibit a proprietor of a covered establishment from refusing to serve
Negroes, but would also preclude separate accommodations. Thus,
for example, the manager of a restaurant which is squarely within
the bill could not relegate Negroes to a specific section reserved
solely for that race. There are ample grounds to support this con-
clusion. Initially, the act specifically states, without equivocation,
that no one may be denied, because of race, color, religion or nation-
al origin, full and equal access to the goods, services, privileges and
advantages of the establishment. Obviously, relegation to a "Jim
Crow" section of an enumerated accommodation, or segregated
washrooms would not satisfy the statutory command of full and
equal access. Secondly, Brown v. Board of Educ.5° reversed the prin-
ciple of "separate but equal" as found in Plessy v. Ferguson.5'
Separate facilities are taken to import inherent inequality. While it
is true that the principle announced in Brown was directed at school
segregation, the validity of the premise can be analogously applied
to public accommodations. Surely the Court did not, nor would it,
restrict that principle to a narrow application. Lastly, the decisions
in state courts considering this very question have, without hesita-
tion, condemned the separate but equal treatment of Negroes. In
Michigan, for example, the proprietor of a saloon-restaurant may
not require Negroes to eat meals in a tavern section while white
patrons are free to choose where they will sit.52  This same principle
of equality and fullness of access applies to all enumerated establish-
ments.
48. 78 Stat. 243, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000a(a) (1964).
49. Ibid.
50. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
51. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
52. Ferguson v. Giles, 82 Mich. 358 (1890). Ohio follows a similar construction. In
the Puritan Lunch Co. v. Forman, 29 Ohio Ct. App. 289 (1918), the Negro plaintiff
was asked to eat his meal in what essentially was a kitchen. The court concluded that
the defendant's request had as its unspoken purpose the intent
to constantly remind the blackman that his is an inferior race, whereas our
constitutions, our legislation, our avowed public policy, all say it is an equal
race in the eye of the law. Id. at 298.
The same rule was applied in the case of a theater in Guy v. The Tri-State Amusement
Co., 7 Ohio App. 509 (1917).
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Opponents of section 201 (a) 53 argue that the proprietors' right
to remove objectionable patrons is seriously impinged.5" But a rea-
sonable construction of the pertinent section does not lead to that
conclusion. Indeed, the section does not preclude selective practices
with respect to potential customers, provided the same standards of
admission are applied to all races, colors, religions, and national
origins. The ejection of a boisterous individual, regardless of race,
could not subject the proprietor of a named establishment to liabil-
ity. It is pointed out, however, by opponents of the bill that the
owner's ejection of an undesirable patron may precipitate an action
under the act. They further indicate that if a proprietor is chal-
lenged he must prove that the customer was ejected for a reason
other than race. 5 And, this is decried as a perversion of basic evi-
dence law. But, it is submitted that this objection is specious.
Tactically, the argument is advanced to inject fear and, in truth, has
no foundation in law. There is no section of the act wherein ad-
verse treatment of a Negro person is made prima facie evidence
or even a presumption of discriminatory practice. In seeking pro-
tection of the act, the offended party is put to the burden of proving
discriminatory motivation.5" Naturally the burden of going forward
would shift to the defendant if the plaintiff successfully upheld his
burden. But this is no more burdensome to a defendant in a "dis-
crimination" case than to a defendant in any other type of case.
E. Public Accommodation Defined
Section 201 (b) 7 defines what establishments shall be covered
by the act. The initial requirement is that the establishment must
serve the public. All of the following subsections relating to specif-
ic establishments must be construed in light of the proviso respect-
ing public service. The second general criterion is a condition prece-
53. 78 Stat. 243, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000a(a) (1964).
54. U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. Nnws 1813 (July 20, 1964).
55. Ibid.
56. BUREAU OF NAT'L AFFAIRS, op. cit. supra note 9, at 32. Admittedly, the au-
thority for this proposition is drawn, not from Tide II, but from a discussion with regard
to Title VII. However, it cannot be validly argued that this evidentiary rule is therefore
inapplicable to suits brought under Tide II.
Whether a failure or refusal to hire or a discharge is based on race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin, will be a matter of evidence, and the rules
applied presumably will be similar to those applied under the Labor Relations
Act. The burden of proof initially will rest on the person alleging dis-
crimination, but it will be possible to shift that burden by persuasive evidence
of discrimination. Ibid. (Emphasis added).
57. 78 Stat. 243, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000a(b) (1964).
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dent to liability under the act and is expressed in the alternative.
The named establishments are not liable unless their operations af-
fect commerce or discriminatory activity is supported by state action.
That which affects commerce and that which constitutes state action
are defined in subsequent sections.
Generally, the act does not purport to cover every commercial
establishment, although the effect of one subsection could conceiv-
ably accomplish that end.58
(1) Lodgings.-Section 201 (b) (1)"9 proscribes discrimination
in lodgings provided for transient guests. In its terms the section
conjunctively includes all establishments which (1) serve the public,
(2) serve transients, and (3) the operation of which affects com-
merce, with a single exception. With respect to that exception,
Congress excluded the so-called "Mrs. Murphy's Boarding House"
from coverage. Specifically, the exclusion covers lodgings that are
located in a building containing no more than five rooms for rent.
Also, the proprietor must actually occupy a part of the establishment.
This exception represents a congressional concession to a reductio
ad absurdam. At a time when the public accommodations section
had not been completely written, opponents of the presidential rec-
ommendation appealed to the emotions by painting a vivid portrait
of the ancient widow operating a three or four room tourist home
who would, by force of the bill, be required to accommodate tran-
sients without regard to race. Perhaps a combination of several fac-
tors assisted in moving Congress to write in this exception. First,
and perhaps foremost, drafting this exception represented legislative
"thunder-stealing." Without the "Mrs. Murphy's Boarding House"
argument, opponents of the measure could not conjure up the pathos
necessary to stir nation-wide resentment. Second, and related to the
first, these small establishments are not significant enough in num-
ber to warrant the legislative battle that would certainly have en-
sued. Third, the relationship between the small proprietor and
the transient lodger are distinctly personal. This is not so in large
motels or hotels. In the typical boarding house or tourist home,
sanitary facilities are usually shared. Also, common meals are some-
times provided.
In drafting this exception to the general coverage of the statute,
Congress was quite specific in requiring that the excused establish-
ment be actually occupied by the proprietor. Thus, it would seem
58. 78 Star. 243, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000a(b) (4) (1964).
59. 78 Stat. 243, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000a(b) (1) (1964).
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that the proprietor must reside in the building; daytime habitation
or mailing address usage would not seem to satisfy the statutory re-
quirement. Also, it is apparent that Congress did not intend to al-
low- corporations a refuge under this exception. Had Congress in-
tended to include corporations within the exception, it certainly
would have employed the word "person" as was done in section
204(a),60 and not the word "proprietor." Further, the exception
does not appear to apply to tourist or motel courts comprised of
units or cabins not part of one building. Thus, if an individual
owned four separate cabins which he rented to transients, the exclu-
sion would not be applicable; the rooms or units must be a part of
one building wherein the proprietor resides. Now that the "board-
ing house" exception has been considered, attention should be re-
called to the principal force of section 201 (b) (1)."
As noted above, the lodging must serve the public. Although
a particular business may provide lodging for transients, it may not,
in fact, be open to the public at large. Reference is made here to a
business not excluded in the private club exception expressed in sec-
tion 201 e) Conversely, the act does not apply to a business
which provides public lodging but does not receive any transient
guests. It is important to note that the section is quite emphatic in
stating that a lodging business will be a place of public accommoda-
tion if it "provides lodging to transient guests." Therefore, a hotel
which rents only ten per cent of its rooms (or less for that matter)
to transients will be obliged to render service to all applicants.
Another question not so readily resolved is that of defining the
term "transient." The act is silent concerning the meaning of that
word. Conceivably, residence in a hotel for a month may constitute
service to transients; or, on the other hand, it could constitute non-
transient residence. The definition of transient seems to be a ques-
tion of fact depending in great measure upon the nature of the facil-
ity and the locale. Thus, a summer resort renting cottages for a
month or more may fit within the act. But in a large cosmopoli-
tan hotel, one month of residence may properly be non-transient. Of
course, the definition of transient cannot depend upon the meaning
imported to the word "transient" by the establishment itself. This
would defeat the purpose of the legislation. It is unfortunate that
Congress did not define "transient." The owner of a lodging is
60. 78 Stat. 243, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000a(a) (1964).
61. 78 Stat 243,42 U.S.C.A. § 2000a(b) (1) (1964).
62. 78 Stat. 243, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000a(e) (1964).
1965]
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
presently without any notion of the temporal requirement he must
satisfy to escape operation of the act.63
As a guideline for future conduct, formally leased accommoda-
tions for a definite period may fall outside the section. 4 Naturally,
a sham lease will receive short shrift from a court asked to rule on
its authenticity.
Finally, the section extends to the named accommodations if
their operations affect commerce. Little problem is encountered in
this regard since Congress in section 201 (c) (1)6 created a con-
clusive presumption that all establishments named in section 201
(b) (1)6 affect commerce within the meaning of Title II. The
correctness of this congressional assumption is largely moot except
to the academician. Even the Supreme Court declined to speculate in
this regard when the Court ruled on the constitutionality of Title I1.67
In any event, the legislative history is replete with testimony indi-
cating the burden on commerce imposed.by discrimination of this sort.
(2) Restaurants.-Section 201 (b) (2)68 proscribes discrimina-
tory practices in certain restaurants, cafeterias, lunchrooms or lunch
counters, and soda fountains. Included within the subsection is any
facility principally engaged in the sale of food for on-premises con-
sumption. Included within the ban are retail establishments wherein
food is sold. Gasoline stations are also included in this subsection.
This portion of the act is desikned to provide blanket coverage for
all catering places that serve the public and the operations of which
affect commerce. Here, as opposed to section 201 (b) (1),6 there
are no exceptions. The provision respecting the sale of food on the
premises of any retail establishment is obviously designed to include
drugstore and department store lunch counters.7
0
This section is not as pervasive as is subsection 201 (b) (1), 71
63. Reliance on the advice of counsel regarding the definition of transient will not
be regarded as a defense. This tack was taken in an Ohio case wherein the defendant
alleged no bad faith in that he had relied on advice of counsel. The court rejected this
defense out of hand. 'This was in no sense a defense and when it appeared without
more, it [the alleged act] was sufficient to support the cause of action .. ." McCrary v.
Jones, 39 N.E.2d 167, 170 (1941).
64. See Alesberg v. Lucerne Hotel Co., 46 Misc. 617, 92 N.Y. Supp. 851 (1905).
65. 78 Stat. 243, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000a(c) (1) (1964).
66. 78 Star. 243, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000a(b) (1) (1964).
67. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964). The issues
surrounding the commerce clause and the act will be discussed in detail at p. 689 supra.
68. 78 Star. 243, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000a(b) (2) (1964).
69. 78 Star. 243,42 U.S.C.A. § 2000a(b) (1) (1964).
70. BUREAU OF NAT'L AFFAIRS, THE CIVIL RIGHTS AcT OF 1964, at 82 (1964).
71. 78 Star. 243, 32 U.S.C.A. § 2000a(b) (1) (1964).
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for the definition of "affecting commerce" is considerably restricted.
Section 201 (c) (2) 2 delineates the two tests applicable to estab-
lishments named in this subsection. If the, eating place serves or of-
fers to serve interstate travelers, it falls within the title. Also, if the
establishment sells a substantial amount 'of food which has moved in
commerce, it will be.subj&t to the act. 'The practical difficulties in-
volved in avoiding the two tests suggest that Congress, while fully
aware of its plenary power over interstate commerce, hoped sub rosa
to include many more establishments through default. What will
constitute an offer to serve? Typically, restaurants and similar es-
tablishments especially in smaller cities and villages advertise on
highway signs. Perhaps a sign stating "Eat atX's Restaurant - 500
feet ahead'" located 6an a state highway commonly .used by interstate'
travelers will' constitute an offer to serve interstate travelers. In-
deed, less overt invitations may constitute a constructive invitation
to interstate travelers. Proximity to interstate traffic might consti-
tute a constructive offer to serveinterstate commerce. In addition'
to an offer to serve, the fact of service rendered to interstate custo-
mers will, regardless of the'proprietor's intent, place the business
within the section. As a. practical matter, restaurant operators will
not ask a white patr6in if he is traveling in interstate commerce, and
then refuse Se rice if ai affirmative .ariswer is received. But that
failure i6 ask and the'readiness to serve regardless of place of origin
will unwittingly place the' establishment within the purview of Title
If. It is important to note that. once. the establishment is covered
via interstate contacts, the restaurant must' also serve local residents
without regard to color. Section 201 (a) 3 does not say "interstate
travelers shall be entitled" but that. "all persons shall be entitled" to
access to public'accommodations. This also pertains to the discus-
sion under section 201 (b) (1).'
Section 201 (b) (2) " also includes gasoline stations., In terms
of the dispensation of gas and oil products, this inclusion was hardly
necessary in that discrimination is usually not directed at those pur-
chases. But it does become significant in relation to section 201
(b) (4).76 All gasoline stations dispensing nationally advertised
products will, ipso facto, be included within the "offer to serve" pro-
72. 78 Stat. 243, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000a(c) (2) (1964).
73. 78 Stat. 243,42 U.S.C.A. § 2000a(a) (1964).
74. 78 Star. 243,42 U.S.C.A. § 2000a(b) (1) (1964).
75. 78 Star. 243, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000a(b) (2) (1964).
76. 78 Stat. 243,42 U.S.C.A. 5 2000a(b) (4) (1964).
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vision of section 201 (c) (2)." Also, it is even more unlikely that
a gas station operator will request origin information or refuse ser-
vice to an out-of-state motorist.
However, should a restaurant, retail establishment, or gasoline
station operator be wary enough to foreclose the possibility of serv-
ing or offering to serve interstate customers, there is little possibility
of escaping the sweeping secondary definition of that which affects
commerce. In section 201(c) (2),78 Congress specified that if an
eating establishment serves a substantial portion of food that has
moved in interstate commerce, it will be subject to the act. The
question of what "substantial" means is, like "transient" and "offer
to serve," largely a matter of fact that must be decided in each indi-
vidual case. There is, however, one indication in Katzenbach v.
McClung." There, the restaurant's out-of-state purchases repre-
sented 46 per cent of the total food sold. And, the Supreme Court
did not indicate that 46 per cent would be the minimum percentage
within the framework of "substantial." It is conceivable that the
percentage could be a good bit lower than 46 per cent. A workable
standard must be formulated to guide lower courts and, even pro-
prietors. One possible method for determining a "substantial por-
tion of the food which it serves" might be the following. But for
the food purchased from interstate sources, could the restaurant sus-
tain the service it provides? As a matter of practice, this would in-
volve subtracting the amount of food purchased from interstate
sources from the total food served in the establishment. If the re-
mainder would permit the restaurant to sustain its customary ser-
vice, then its operations should not, absent other circumstances, be
circumscribed by the act. For example, X's diner may purchase beef
from sources without the domiciliary state while all other products
are purchased domestically. In that case it is clear that without
beef, X could not maintain his customary service. However, if X
purchased pork, some vegetables, chicken and pastry from outside
his own state, perhaps he could render his customary service albeit
a bit truncated. But regardless of the test utilized, substantiality
will be a matter for the trier of fact.
With respect to retail establishments, the section is clear that
even though the lunch counter within the store purchases all of its
77. 78 Stat. 243, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000a(c) (2) (1964). In this regard, national ad-
vertising keyed to interstate travelers should be regarded as an offer to serve.
78. Ibid.
79. 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
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products from local sources, that counter must be desegregated if
the retail outlet sells a substantial portion of products that have
traveled in interstate commerce. The same is true with regard to
gasoline stations. In both instances, the test of substantiality poses
as great a problem as in the restaurant situation.
(3) Entertainment.-Section 201 (b) (3) " proscribes discrim-
ination in all mediums of exhibition or entertainment. As in the
case of restaurants and lodgings, the section is applicable if it is open
to the public and if its operations affect commerce.
While restaurants affect commerce if a substantial portion of
food served has moved in commerce, places of entertainment affect
commerce if they customarily present sources of entertainment that
have moved in commerce."' Again the word customarily, like sub-
stantiality, is open to various interpretations. A movie house, for
example, that presents domestic films six nights a week and on the
seventh night presents an out-of-state movie would probably be with-
in the section. Within the span of one week, the theater customar-
ily shows domestic films, however, the schedule taken as a whole
dearly depicts a custom of showing an out-of-state movie once a
week. Sporting events are subject to similar considerations. Suppose
a privately owned arena produces local sporting events. However,
several times a year a team located without the state plays in the
arena. In that situation, compliance with the section would prob-
ably not be required since the customary fare is local talent. A lo-
cally produced track meet comprised of local talent competing with
non-resident individuals would probably not invoke the section since
the definition of what will affect commerce includes only non-resi-
dent teams. It should be recalled that once a custom of producing
non-domiciliary entertainment has been established, the facility must
be desegregated for all events of whatever origin. The act does not
limit the application of the section solely to those events not locally
produced.
While the section is not comprehensive in its description of
specific facilities, the principle of ejusdem generis will be applied to
broaden the scope within the meaning of "other place of exhibition
or entertainment."
State courts have wrestled with the problem of interpreting
specific incidents of coverage followed by all inclusive general words
of coverage. Although not all states have extended their respective
80. 78 Stat. 243,42 U.S.C.A. § 2000a(b) (3) (1964).
81. 78 Star. 243,42 U.S.C.A. § 2000a(c) (3) (1964).
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statutes to include establishments normally considered as places of
public accomifiodation they have been uniform in recognizing the
principle of extension. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court dealt with
this problem and concluded that their statute in no wise implies
that only enumerated places are within the purview of the statute
to the exclusion of places not mentioned.8" The Ohio public accom-
modations statute 3 has received a similar construction.84 A lower
court was asked to interpret the Ohio statute to include ice cream
parlors and the court concluded that it was permitted wide latitude
in construing the statute.8" This holding was prompted by the
words,:and all other places of public accommodation" following a
specific enumeration of establishments.86 Thus, federal courts
should experience little difficulty in extending section 201 (b) (3) "
to include unlisted places of exhibition and entertainment. For ex-
ample, bowling alleys might be brought within the act if it can be
shown that they affect commerce and are open to the public.88
(4) Other Establishments.-Section 201 (b) (4)89 is perhaps
the most pervasive section in Title II. Moreover, its effect will be
more pronounced and widespread than the other three subsections."
This subsection is divided into two further divisions. In section 201
(b) (4) (A) (i),91 any establishment which is physically located
within the premises of an establishment named in sections 201 (b)
(1), (2) and (3)92 is, ipso facto, a place of public accommoda-
tion. Opponents of the measure have argued that any establish-
ment of whatever nature would be covered if located within a
named establishment. The contarary is closer to its actual effect.
Section 201(b)93 specifically states, before delving into the vari-
ous subsections that only establishments which serve the public
82. Everett v. Harron, 380 Pa. 123, 110 A.2d 383 (1955). The decision is especially
significant because the Pennsylvania statute is relatively detailed and might be fairly
construed as limited to the named establishments. A fortiori, a less detailed statute
should receive similar treatment. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4654 (1963).
83. OHIO REV. CODE § 2901.35, .36.
84. Fowler v. Benner, 13 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 313 (C.P. 1912).
85. Id. at 318.
86. Cf. Harvey, Inc. v. Sissle, 53 Ohio App. 405, 5 N.E.2d 410 (1936). Contra,
Faulkner v. Solazzi, 79 Conn. 541, 65 Atl. 947 (1907).
87. 78 Stat. 243, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000a(b) (3) (1964).
88. Contra, BuREAU OF NAT'L AFFAIRS, OP. cit. supra note 70, at 83.
89. 78 Star. 243, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000a(b) (4) (1964).
90. BUREAU OF NAT'L AFFAIRS, op. cit. supra note 70, at 84.
91. 78 Stat. 243, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000a(b) (4) (A) (i) (1964).
92. 78 Star. 243, 42 U.S.C.A. 55 2000a(b) (1)-(3) (1964).
93. 78 Stat. 243, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000a(b) (1964).
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can be places of public accommodation. " Further, the establish-
ment must, according to section 201 (b) (4) (B) 9 hold itself out
as serving patrons of the covered establishment. Also, its opera-
tions must affect commerce. It is true, however; that "affecting
commerce" is irrebutably presumed by virtue of physical affinity to
a named establishment. But the establishment must still serve the
public as well as hold itself out as serving patrons of the main es-
tablishment. Thus, although the main establishment serves -the pub-
lic, the two driteria must also be met by the attached establishment.
The confusion over this issue can be traced to the mistaken belief
that the test of public service is included within the sections covering
restaurants, lodgings, and entertainment establishments; it is not.
Serving the public is a general qualification applicable to all four
subsections. An illustration will readily clarify the matter. 'Sup-
pose the XYZ law firm is located within the premises of a hotel
admittedly a public accommodation according to section 201 (b)
(1)." Also, the hotel management refers its guest to the XYZ firm
for legal assistance. Opponents of the Civil Rights enactment have
argued that the law firm would be forced to serve anyone seeking
legal aid by virtue of section 201(b) (4)." But despite the fact
that a hotel is a place of public accommodation, the law firm is
located in the same building, and the firm serves patrons of the ho-
tel, it is not a place of public accommodation since law firms do not
engage in public service. Lawyers may, without cause, refuse ciients
by choice. 7 It is submitted that the same reasoning applies to ddn-
tists, doctors and the like. State courts have long excepted these
professionals from local public accommodation laws. 8 It is, how-
ever, in the areas normally considered as serving the public that sec-
tion 201 (b) (4)00 has the greatest effect.
94. 78 Stat. 243, 42 U.S.C.A. -2000a(b) (4) (B)_ (1964).
95., .78 Stat 243,42 U.S.C.A. § 2000a(b) (1) (1964).
96. .78 Start.243, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000a(b) (4) (1964). See U.S. CobE CONG. & AD.
NEws 1838 (July 20, 1964).
97. AMmucAN BAR ASS'N CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS IN TRUMBULL, MA-
tERIALS ON THE LAWYER'S PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Canon 31, 373 (1957)."
No lawyer is obliged to act either as adviser or advocate for every peison who
may wish to become his client. .He, has the right to decline employment.
Id. at 383. (Emphasis added.)
98. E.g., Rice v. Rinaldo, 44 OHIO OP. 286 (C.P. 1950). In Rice, the defendant
was a dentist who had refused to treat the plaintiff solely, because plaintiff was a Negro.
The court's reasoning, while for the defendant, is w eak.However,.the decision is in
line with the majority of jurisdictions. Lawyers were also excepted from operation of
the Ohio act via dictum in the opinion.
99. 78 Stat 243,42 U.S.C.A. § 2000a'(b) (4) (1964).
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In addition to the previously mentioned physical location within
the premises of a covered establishment,' the converse situation is
covered in section 201 (b) (4) (A) (ii)."' Any establishment in
which is located a covered establishment is also a place of public
accommodation. For example, a bowling alley not covered by sec-
tion 201 (b) (3)102 but which contained a lunch counter covered by
section 201 (b) (2)... would also be within the act.' As is readily
apparent, this section greatly expands the coverage of the act into
areas that are truly intrastate commerce. An establishment located
within a covered establishment such as hotel barbershops, beauty
salons, bars, shoe shine parlors, secretarial services, car rental and
theater ticket offices, and a host of other services, are now within
the purview of the act. In regard to an establishment in which is
located a covered establishment, wholly local activities such as bowl-
ing alleys, skating rinks, billiard halls, and amusement parks, where-
in food, entertainment or lodging of the type mentioned in sections
201(b) (1), (2) and (3)105 are available are now within the act.
Aside from physical affinity, there are only two limitations on the scope
of this subsection. The establishment involved must serve the public'
and it must hold itself out as serving the patrons of the covered es-
tablishment.' If the establishment located within the covered es-
tablishment or the establishment within which is located a covered
establishment neither holds itself out as serving the public nor holds
itself out as serving patrons of the covered establishment, then the
act would not be applicable. However, the likelihood of coverage
for purely local businesses and services is far greater because
of section 201 (b) (4)08 than it would be without that section. In-
equitable results may flow from this section insofar as individual
proprietors are concerned. For instance, two bowling alleys located
across the street from one another could be oppositely affected. Sup-
pose one bowling alley boasted a lunch counter that purchased a sub-
stantial portion of its food from interstate sources. That bowling
alley would be required to accept non-white patronage, whereas the
100. 78 Stat. 243, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000a(b) (4) (A) (1) (1964).
101. 78 Stat. 243, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000a(b) (4) (A) (i) (1964).
102. 78 Stat. 243, 42 U.S.CA. § 2000a(b) (3) (1964).
103. 78 Stat. 243,42 U.S.C.A. § 2000a(b) (2) (1964).
104. BUREAU OF NAT'L AFFAIRS, op. cit. supra note 70, at 84.
105. 78 Stat. 243,42 U.S.C.A. § 2000a(b) (1)-(3) (1964).
106. 78 Stat. 243,42 U.S.CA. § 2000a(b) (1964).
107. 78 Stat. 243, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000a(b) (4) (B) (1964).
108. 78 Stat. 243, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000a(b) (4) (1964).
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bowling alley across the street might be unrestricted in its discrimi-
natory practices. Certainly, a degree of sympathy would not be out
of order for the proprietor faced with this inequitable application;
however, when his plight is counterbalanced with the social inequity
encountered by Negro citizens, the individual's difficulty pales.
t. State Action
The presence of state authority promoting discrimination is an
integral part of the effect of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Title II
coverage of a public accommodation is predicated upon two alterna-
tive grounds. Initially, 201 (b) 9 declares that if the operation of
an establishment affects commerce it falls within the act's proscrip-
tions. Second, according to the same section, if discrimination in the
named establishments is supported by state action, they too are gov-
erned by Title 1H. It is to the latter that attention is now turned.
(1) State Law.-State action is defined in Title 1I as encompass-
ing three types of governmental activity. 1 ' First, state action is found
when discrimination is carried on under color of any state law, stat-
ute, ordinance, or regulation."' This would obviously relate to
direct or indirect legislation or administrative, regulation that pro-
motes discrimination, or on the other hand forbids integration. It
is not likely that many actions will be brought under this subsection
simply because-the level of sophistication in traditionally segregated
states has erased overt discriminatory statutes. They have been re-
placed with the anti-business trespass statute which "reaffirms" the
proprietor's "right" to select his customers and reject those he deems
undesirable." 2 Although the unmistakable intent of these statutes
is to preserve a segregated order, it would be highly speculative to
argue that the act postulates these statutes as state action supporting
segregation or discrimination in every conceivable business activity.
(2) Custom or Usage.-State action is also found when dis-
crimination is enforced by state officials under color of custom or
usage." 3 In this situation, visualizations of congressional intent
come readily to mind. For example, suppose segregation has been
practiced in a small town for many years, and it has been the cus-
tom in local theaters to seat Negro patrons in the rear balcony. Then
109. 78 Sta. 243, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000a(b) (1964).
110. 78 Stat. 243, 42 U.S.CA. §§ 2000a(d) (1)-(3) (1964).
111. 78 Stat 243,42 U.S.CA. § 2000a(d) (1) (1964).
112. Miss. CODE ANN. § 2046.5 (1957).
113. 78 Sta. 243, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000a(d) (2) 1964).
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a Negro attempts to enter a theater loge, refusing to sit in the balcony.
The manager refuses to admit the Negro patron to the loge and sum-
mons local law enforcement officials to assist him in ejecting the un-
wanted intruder. The police arrive and remove the Negro from the
theater foyer. Since custom dictates that Negroes may not sit in the
loge area, and the police have been summoned to eject a Negro who
will not sit in the balcony, the police have enforced discrimination
under color of custom. The movie house, therefore, falls within the
purview of the act, even though it presents only domestic films.
(3) Action of the State.-State action is also found when
discrimination is carried on by action of the state or a political sub-
division. Evidently, Congress foresaw an incident where state ac-
tion, apart from statute or custom, might enforce discrimination.
For example, the municipal owner of a stadium may provide for
segregated seating without the benefit of statute. Here, of course,
the stadium would fall within the act.
It must be recalled that any establishment that serves the public
and practices discrimination, regardless of its effect on commerce, is
within the act so long as state action supports that course of action.
Congress noted, however, that the mere licensing of a segregated fa-
cility would not impute state action." 4 But it seems from even a
cursory reading of the state action sections, that Congress was utiliz-
ing the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution
according to the prescriptions set down by the United States Supreme
Court in the Civil Rights Cases."5
These cases were brought to test the constitutionality of the
Civil Rights Act of 1875."' There, Congress sought to forbid dis-
crimination in all public accommodations without regard to state
boundary lines. The Court found that the subject matter of the
Act of 1875 was an attempt to control individual action". and
the fourteenth amendment could not support an invasion by Con-
gress of- this nature." 8 In short, Congress could not take the place
of state legislatures and thereby supersede them. Justice Bradley
114. BUREAU OF NAT'L AFFAIRS, op. cit. supra note 70, at 85.
115. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
116. Civil Rights Act of 1875, 18 Stat. 335.
117. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883).
118. Id. at 13. "Such legislation cannot properly, cover the whole domain of rights
appertaining to life, liberty and property, defining them and providing for their vindi-
cation." Ibid.
The Court went on to declare that congressional action had been tantamount to
establishing a municipal code to regulate the prii'ate rights between men.
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indicated that if the act had been directed at state action, it would
have survived the cohstitutional question."' Further, the Supreme
Court, in dictum, hinted that where Congress is vested with plenary
power, no consideration of state boundaries is relevant, such as in
the regulation of commerce. 2 ° Fully cognizant of the'present day
application of this decision the eighty-eighth Congress used its
plenary commerce power in the Act of 1964 to forbid discrimina-
tion in places of public accommodation. Section 201(d). 2 satis-
fies all of the objections posed by the Court in the Civil Rights
Cases.'" In that case, the Court was also asked to consider -the
-effect of the thirteenth amendaent.2 . as the basis of the Aa of
i875.124  The argument put to the Court contended that the
thirteenth amendment not only freed the slaves, but abolished the
badges or incidents of a servile'condition. In- that vein, -denial
of access to places of public accommodation was a badge or incident
of slavery. The Court's answer was abrupt. Justice Bradley dis-
missed the argument as "running the slavery argument into the
ground . The majority opinion, though siholarly in ap-
proach, trails off in historical and logical inconsistency. The Court
declared that after the slave had shaken off servitude and the im-
pediments of that state, he ought to stand as any "other man with
respect to his rights as a citizen. In other words, there is a stage
in the progress to full citizenship when the former slave can no
longer look to a benevolent government in search of redress and he
then must protect'his rights by ordinary modes.' 6
119. Id. at 18.
120. "Of course, these remarks do not apply to those cases in which Congress is
clothed with direct and plenary powers of legislation over the whole subject, accom-
panied with an express or implied denial of such power to the States, as in the regulation
of commerce... Ibid. (Emphasis added.)
121. 78 Stat. 243, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000a(d) (19645.
122.' 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
123. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
124. Ciyil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 19 (1893).
125, Ibid.
It would be running the slavery argument into the ground to make it apply.
to every act of discrimination which a person may see fit-to make as.to the
guests he will entertain, or as to the people he will take into his coach or
cab or car, or admit to his concert or theater, or deal.with in other matters
of intercourse or business. Ibid,
126. Id. at 25. The words of the justice are worth quoting if only to demonstrate that
perhaps denial of access to public accommodations is indeed an "accoutrement" of a
servile condition.
When a man has emerged from slavery, and by the aid .f a beneficent legis-.
lation has shaken off the inseparable concomitants of that state, there must be
some stage in the progress of his elevation when he takes the rank of a mere.
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Justice Harlan, in a vigorous dissent, challenged the Court's
conclusions with respect to the scope of the thirteenth and fourteenth
amendments. In brief, he argued that the state licenses public
accommodations and because of that grant the establishment's right
to remain open is based upon the sanction of public authority. And
since local government represents all colors, it is inconceivable that
a segment of those from whom all power flows should be denied
entry into places that remain open by public fiat. That the state
permits this to occur is an affront to the dignity of those denied
access, and imports sufficient state action to warrant invoking the
fourteenth amendment.'27 The argument with respect to the thir-
teenth amendment is simply that the denial of access to a public
accommodation is a badge or incident of slavery that warrants
congressional action under that amendment.'28
G. Private Clubs
As noted before, only establishments that serve the public can
be places of public accommodation. 2 ' However, Congress saw fit
to add a specific subsection declaring that private clubs or estab-
lishments not, de facto, open to the public are excluded from the
provisions of Title U1.3' But, the club must truly be private. Admis-
sion of the public on even a limited scale will probably result in
forfeiture of the private club status. One caveat must be added:
if the facilities of a private club or establishment not open to the
public are made available to patrons of establishments named in
section 201 (b),' 3 ' then discrimination is prohibited. This section
is self-explanatory and, thus, requires no elaboration. Nevertheless,
there was an attempt in the House version of the bill to provide
that only bona fide private clubs would be exempt.'32 In the
citizen, and ceases to be the special favorite of the laws, and when his rights
as a citizen, or a man, are to be protected in the ordinary modes by which
other men's rights are protected. Ibid.
127. Id. at 41. "A license from the public to establish a place of public amusement,
imports in law, equality of right, at such places, among all members of that public."
Ibid.
128. Id. at 37.
IT)he power of Congress under the Thirteenth Amendment is not necessarily
restricted to legislation against slavery as an institution upheld by positive law,
but may be exerted to the extent, at least, of protecting the liberated race
against discrimination, in respect of legal rights belonging to freemen, where
such discrimination is based upon race. Ibid.
129. 78 Stat. 243, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000a(b) (1964).
130. 78 Star. 243, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000a(e) (1964).
131. 78 Stat. 243, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000a(b) (1964).
132. U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1768 (July 20, 1964).
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final product, however, the words "bona fide" were struck from the
exemption application to private clubs. It would seem, therefore,
that a group may organize a private club with the express purpose of
excluding Negroes and do so with impunity. This change should be
applauded. There are far too many instances of ambiguity in the
act without adding the burden of investigating the organizational in-
tent of private dubs.
H. Entitlement
The last substantive section of Tide II is properly another "state
action" section.1 3  Sections 201 (b)13 4 and 201 (d) 135 forbid state
supported discrimination in any named establishment. But section
202138 declares that every establishment or place of whatever nature
shall be free from state supported discrimination. This section simply
utilizes the fourteenth amendment in its broadest scope. Thus, even
though a particular establishment is of an entirely local character,
it may not discriminate via the utilization of any state law, statute,
regulation, and the like.
V. REMEDIES UNDER TITLE II
Remedial action under Title IJ is purposefully limited to in-
junctive action. Of course, the court may impose criminal penalties
in the event that an injunction is ignored. But the tenor of the
remedy sections is conciliatory. Great reliance is placed upon local
resolution of racial problems in states with public accommodation
laws. This approach is entirely in keeping with the stated purpose
of the legislation which is a peaceful resolution of problems arising
out of a social revolution.
A. Interference
Section 203137 prohibits anyone from interfering in any way
with rights and privileges granted under the substantive sections of
Tide II. Also, punishment for the exercise of those rights is ex-
pressly prohibited.' This prohibition would seem to be directed
133. 78 Star. 244, 42 U.S.CA. § 2000a-1 (1964).
134. 78 Stat. 243, 42 U.S.C.A. 5 2000a(b) (1964).
135. 78 Stat. 243, 42 U.S.C.A. 5 2000a(d) (1964).
136. 78 Stat. 244, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000a-1 (1964).
137. 78 Stat. 244, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000a-2 (1964).
138. 78 Stat. 244, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000a-2(c) (1964).
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against civil and criminal trespass actions where the defendant was
seeking entry into a public accommodation and was ejected solely
because of race. This section would abate any local action under the
supremacy clause."3 9
B. Restraining Orders
Section 204(a) 40 provides that a civil action may be brought
requesting relief when a violation of section 203' is imminent or
in progress. This preventive relief includes a temporary and perma-
nent injunction or restraining order. The individual who has been
or will be wronged by a denial of rights granted in the substantive
portions of Title II is the proper party to bring the action.
The same section permits the Attorney General to intervene in
an action brought by an individual, but only when the Attorney
General certifies to the court that. the case is of pressing public in-
terest. 42 Apparently, the court may, in its discretion, refuse to allow
intervention by the Attorney General. This conclusion is warranted
when one considers that the House version of Title II would have
permitted the Attorney General to sue for an injunction, ad libitum.
That Congress eventually changed the portion of the bill authorizing
this action buttresses the conclusion that federal intervention will be
permitted only in unusual circumstances. The special circumstances
might include a novel application of the act that might impair its
vitality, an impecunious plaintiff, or one who through intimidation
fears for his safety if a suit were to be brought by him.
C. Procedure in States with Public Accommodation Laws
Section 204 (c) "' is indicative of the congressional intent to per-
mit states to settle their racial problems on a local level. In that
spirit, Congress required that states with public accommodation laws
as well as appropriate enforcement procedures be notified of pend-
ing suits. The state wherein the alleged violation is said to have
occurred must be notified in a specified fashion to the end that the
state can proceed under its laws to remedy the violation. After ap-
propriate notice, the state has thirty days within which to initiate
139. Hamm v. City of Rock Hill, 379 U.S. 306 (1964).
140. 78 Star. 244, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000a-3(a) (1964).
141. 78 Stat. 244, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000a-2 (1964).
142. BUREAU OF NAT'L AFFAIRS, THE CIVIL RIGHTS AcT OF 1964, at 87 (1964).
143. 78 Stat. 244, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000a-3(c) (1964).
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proceedings. If the state fails to act, then the provisions of section
204'(a). can be invoked. For example, suppose X, a Negro, is
denied access to a restaurant located in Ohio. The Ohio Revised
Code specifically prohibits discrimination in restaurants and also pro-
vides for criminal penalties for the violation of the section.1 45  Ohio
also has recently created a Civil Rights Commission charged with
the responsibility of resolving, to the extent of its power, racial
disturbances.'46 Because of these statutes, X may not proceed
against the restaurant under Tide II, but must notify the proper local
authorities of the violation. This section of Title'II does not desig-
nate which local authority should be notified, but presumably'this
designation is left to the states. In Ohio, it is submitted that in a
criminal action under section 2901.35, the proper authority is the'
prosecutor of the county wherein the violation took place. Under
the Ohio Revised Code's provision for a Civil Rights Commission,
the proper party to notify would be-that body. If Ohio fails to take
the initiative in remedying the situation within thirty days, X can
bring an action in a federal district court. 47  -
D. * Procedure in States without Public Accommodation Laws
Section 204 (d) '48 provides that where an .alleged act of discrimi-
nation occurs in a state which has no law,. prohibiting discrimina-
tion, a civil action may be brought under section. 20 4 (a).9 Natural-
ly, since notification would be a vain act, in that situation, no state
authority need be informed of the discriminatory conduct. Never-%
theless, this does not indicate that Congress abandoned the hope of
voluntary settlement. The court in its discretion may refer the mat-
ter to the Community Relations Service established under Title X. 9
As long as the court believes that a voluntary settlement cn.1te ar-
ranged, the court may permit the Community Relations Service to
pursue that course but the Community Relations Service cannot re-
tain jurisdiction for longer than sixty days.' 51
144. 78 Stat. 244, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000a-3(a) (1964).
145. OHIO REV. CODE §§ 2901.35 to .36.
146. OIno REv. CODE §§ 4112.01 to .08.
147. 78 Stat. 245, 42 U.S.C.A. 5 2000a-6(a) (1964).
148. 78 Stat. 244, 42 U.S.C.A. 5 2000a-3(d) (1964).
149. 78 Star. 244, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000a-3(a) (1964).
150. 78 Stat. 267,42 U.S.C.A. § 2000g (1964).
151. 78 Stat. 244, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000a-3 (d) (1964). Although the section, indicates
a sixty day period, the court, in its discretion, may extend the sixty day period to one
hundred and twenty days. If no settlement has been reached, the court must regain
jurisdiction over the matter and enforce Title II.
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E. Suits Initiated by the Attorney General
Section 204 (a) 5 controls the intervention of the Attorney Gen-
eral in an action brought by a private citizen where the question is one
of general public importance. But section 206 (a).. authorizes the
Attorney General to bring an action for injunctive relief when, in his
judgment, he has reasonable cause to believe that a person or per-
sons are engaged in a practice designed to restrict the full enjoyment
of facilities anticipated by Title II. This section seems to provide for
correcting covert action designed to minimize the effect of Title II
as opposed to an effort to vindicate overt discrimination which would
properly be treated under section 204(a)."" An instance of the
unique applicability of section 206(a) 55 would occur in the event
of a mass reaction to Title II. For example, a business men's group
might decide that it will, in concert, discourage Negro patronage
by delaying service in each members' establishment. An individual,
under a strict reading of section 204 (a), "' would be powerless to
enjoin this group action. Yet the Attorney General, clothed as he
is with the power to seek an injunction against "any person or group
of persons... [who are about to engagel in a pattern or practice
of resistance to the full enjoyment of any of the rights secured by
this title,' " 5 can prohibit the concerted covert action of a business
community. In this respect, the "wait and see" attitude of deference
to state authorities and reference to the Community Relations Ser-
vice is inapplicable to a suit brought by the Attorney General. Per-
haps this policy is wise in that speed would seem to be crucial in a
situation comparable to the above example.
F. Enforcement
Section 207(b) 158 is quite clear in stating that the remedies
provided for in Title II are the sole remedies available under the
act. However, it is also pointed out that the section is not designed
to replace or supplant other available state and federal remedies. "9
152. 78 Stat. 244, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000a-3(a) (1964).
153. 78 Stat. 245, 42 U.S.C.A. 5 2000a-5(a) (1964).
154. 78 Stat. 244, 42 U.S.C.A. 5 2000a-3(a) (1964).
155. 78 Stat. 245, 42 U.S.C.A. 5 2000a-5(a) (1964).
156. 78 Star. 244, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000a-3(a) (1964).
157. 78 Stat. 245, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000a-5(a) (1964). (Emphasis added.)
158. 78 Stat. 246, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000a-6(b) (1964).
159. The textual discussion does not, of course, cover each remedial section of
Title II.
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VI. THE COMMERCE CLAUSE AND CONSTITUTIONALITY
The great furor surrounding Title II, the most explosive title
in the Civil Rights Act of 1964, concerned the congressional use of
the commerce clause.6 as one jutification for the act. Opponents
of the measure derided the bill allowing that Congress had abused
its power and that the commerce clause was an insufficient basis
upon which to act. The Congress approached the Civil Rights Act
with some degree of trepidation recalling that the Supreme Court
in 1883 had struck down the Civil Rights Act of 1875.161 It is sug-
gested that Congress made a moral judgment that discrimination
was wrong and then initiated a legislative shopping spree to find
appropriate constitutional "hooks" upon which to peg its determina-
tion. This conclusion is in part substantiated by a brief submitted
to the House Judiciary Committee by Professor Paul Freund. 6 ' In
that brief, Professor Freund wrote that Congress need feel no com-
punction in utilizing the commerce clause to respond to social in-
justice and a deep moral need.3 Indeed, the Supreme Court in
the Civil Rights Cases' suggested the proper basis for a civil rights
act despite its adverse ruling with respect to the Act of 1875. Jus-
tice Bradley remarked that the tenor of his decision would be
wholly inapplicable in an area in which Congress is "clothed with
direct and plenary power" over the entire area "as in the regulation
of Commerce .... ""16  That Court further noted that Congress was
possessed of sufficient power to regulate a proper subject matter in
every detail as well as the conduct of individuals.'66 It is somewhat
surprising that this judicial suggestion was not utilized until eighty
years after its enunciation.
The opponents of Title II rely heavily upon a supposed consti-
tutional infirmity with respect to the commerce clause. Accord-
ing to their interpretation of that clause, Congress can only deal
with the interstate movement of people and chattels as they cross
state boundaries.'67 The essential objection is that Title II not only
160. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. "The Congress shall have power... to regulate com-
merce with foreign nations, and among the several States. ...
161. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
162. U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1739 (July 20, 1964).
163. Ibid. '"The commerce power is dearly adequate and appropriate. No im-
propriety need be felt in using the commerce clause as a response to a deep moral con-
cern."
164. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
165. Id. at 18.
166. Ibid.
167. U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1837 (July 20, 1964).
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demands that accommodations be afforded to transients, but the act
also requires, once the establishment is covered, that accommoda-
tions be extended to local, nontransient Negroes. Irrelevant bul-
warks are then created to buttress the argument. In the main,
these arguments point to congressional action in other areas which,
by analogy, would not extend the commerce clause to the limits
required by the Civil Rights Act of 1964. In other words, Congress
has not gone this far; ergo it "obviously" cannot extend its power
this far. 6' However, the fact that Congress has not yet designated
certain establishments as engaging in interstate commerce is in no
way authoritative for the proposition that Congress does not possess
the power to legislate in a wholly distinct area. Because Congress
has proceeded only so far is not to say that Congress cannot go be-
yond that point. In reply it might be sufficient to say that Congress
has not yet fully utilized its plenary power under the commerce
clause and the necessary powers clause.
With respect to the arguments concerning transient versus non-
transient, it is apparent that opponents of the act have misinter-
preted its effect. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 does not purport to
address itself to a definition of transient or non-transient. The act
does not directly seek to "qualify" certain individuals by reason of
domicile. But, the bill does purport to "qualify" establishments
by determining that a particular establishment affects commerce,
per se. If the former were the case, then no one could justify, under
the commerce clause, requiring acceptance for all who apply for
entry. But, fortunately, Congress has not foolishly entered the
area of defining who will or will not affect commerce. Congress has,
however, defined what, and under what circumstances an establish-
ment will, affect commerce. Therefore, if an accommodation or
place of amusement operates in such a manner as to affect inter-
state commerce, then it must extend those services to all who ask
for them regardless of domicile. Whether this was the most ju-
dicious path along which Congress might have proceeded is irrele-
vant since the only question now open for debate is the constitu-
tionality of that action. In this regard it appears that under the
commerce clause wherein Congress has plenary power169 and under
168. Id. at 1837-38.
Until 1959, even the NLRB did not claim jurisdiction under the interstate
commerce clause over such establishments, and jurisdiction was asserted then
only with respect to hotels grossing more than $500,000 under the theory
that the volume of business was a yardstick to the quantum of interstate
activity. Ibid. (Emphasis added.)
169. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
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the necessary powers clause,17° the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is con-
stitutional.
Commerce Clause
While segregationists would object to any civil rights measure,
the particular "hue and cry" surrounding the use of the commerce
clause can be largely traced to its historical development. The
clause has as its object a dual purpose. First, the commerce
clause represents, next to the war power, the single most impor-
tant source of affirmative federal power. 1 ' Second, the commerce
clause provides the federal government with immense negative or
restrictive power over state and local governments."72 The restric-
tive power possessed by the federal government over interstate
commerce has been emphasized to the extent that any positive power
has been minimized and oft neglected. It is submitted that the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 is based upon that affirmative right to
regulate rather than on the negative right of restriction. Further,
it is necessary to distinguish these powers for it would seem that the
restrictive power could not support the act.' If Congress could
only restrict individuals and states from interfering with interstate"
commerce, it could not compel public accommodations to accept
local non-transient Negroes. But since Congress also possesses the
right to regulate commerce and has all the necessary power to en-
force regulations, Congress could constitutionally require, as a neces-
sary concomitant of interstate activity, public accommodations and
amusements to also accept the trade of local residents.
From a historical point of view, the commerce clause has been
developed and defined as a basically restrictive power over state
activity. Initially, commerce was defined solely as the movement
170. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 18. "The Congress shall have power to make all
laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing
powers ....,
171. CONSTrruTION OF THE U.S. ANNOT. 150 (1963). [hereinafter cited as CONST.
ANNOT.).
172. Ibid. See ROTrScHAEFFER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 228-29 (1939).
173. There is no authority apart from the author's viewpoint to sustain this conclusion.
But that others have not considered this problem renders the thought no less valid
although considerably less persuasive. Consider for a moment the dilemma facing one
who carefully studies the Civil Rights Act. No difficulty is found when utilizing the
congressional restrictive power over commerce, to sustain the act with respect to transient
Negroes. However, how does one justify service to local Negroes under that restrictive
power. Despite the logical difficulty, the dilemma is partially resolved when the act
is juxtaposed with the pervasive power of Congress over the regulation of commerce.
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of chattels in the interstate flow of business.' 74 John Marshall in
Gibbons v. Ogden 75 expanded the definition beyond that of buying
and selling to include all forms of movement'76 anticipating and
including "every species of movement of persons and things....177
It has been estimated that prior to 1900, approximately 1400 com-
merce clause cases reached the Supreme Court. The great majority
of those cases involved the commerce clause as a restriction on state
activity.178  However, in recent years the regulatory or positive
approach has expanded the notion of commerce to include, within
the congressional purview, those operations or activities which in
movement are wholly intrastate, but nevertheless affect interstate
commerce. 17  This spirit has become entrenched to the extent that
the Court now considers that "no form of state activity can constitu-
tionally thwart the regulatory power granted by the commerce
clause to Congress."' °  Again in Gibbons v. Ogden,' Marshall
in examining the power Congress possesses in this regard exclaimed
that the power is one to regulate. He noted that the power was
complete in itself and knew no limitations other than those pre-
scribed in the Constitution.'82 Opponents of the 1964 Civil Rights Act
generally do not challenge the nature of Congress' plenary power
over interstate commerce but do object to its application to intra-
state activity. But the objection is baseless in that the plenary
power extends, in certain circumstances, to intrastate activity."a
The effective control of interstate commerce often involves a neces-
sary degree of control over intrastate activity.' In the case of
174. ROTrsCHAEFFER, op. cit. supra note 172, at 230-31.
175. 9 Wheat. 1 (1824).
176. Id. at 189-92. "The subject to be regulated is commerce; ... The counsel for
the appellee would limit it to traffic, to buying and selling, or the interchange of com-
modities, and do not admit that it comprehends navigation. This would restrict a
general term, applicable to many objects, to one of its significations. Commerce, un-
doubtedly, is traffic, but it is something more - it is intercourse." Ibid. (Emphasis
added.).
177. CONST. ANNOT. op. cit. supra note 171, at 152.
178. Id. at 150.
179. Id. at 153-54. The New Deal legislation typifies the use of the regulatory power.
Id. at 182-93.
180. United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110, 119 (1942).
181. 9 Wheat 1 (1824).
182. Id. at 196.
183. This objection could only be aimed at section 201(b) (1), 78 Star. 243, 42
U.S.C.A. § 2000a(b) (1) (1964), which presumptively concludes that lodgings serving
the public affect interstate commerce. The other accommodations mentioned in the
act affect commerce by their own activities.
184. ROTrsCHAEFFER, op. cit. supra note 172, at 252.
However, the power of Congress over... activities is not limited to such part
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lodgings, for expmaple, there may be some situations wherein strictly
local dealings are involved. Although this may be the case, con-
gressional control is still valid in that the act does not cover deal-'
ings or people but is concerned with establishments. Once an es-
tablishment is within the act it does not vacillate in and out of the
penumbra of coverage but remains covered for all purposes. It
would be ludicrous to argue that for a series of five people or five
dealings, a motel would be in interstate commerce three times and
intrastate commerce twice.
B. Non-Commercial Commerce
In assessing the rectitude of congressional action, there is no
need to delve into the myriad economic relationships between public
accommodations and amusements, denial of access to Negroes and
the total effect on the nation's economy. Moral -and quasi-moral
reasons may be advanced to support congressional action in the area
of interstate commerce. For example, the Mann White Slavery Act
prohibits the interstate transportation of women for immoral pur-
poses. This form of morality legislation, although sustained under
the commerce dause,l 85 involves no element of commerce. The
public accommodations section of the act is primarily directed toward
the same end; namely, the eradication of a congressionally deter-
mined immoral situation.
The Supreme Court and the Act
Two test cases arose almost immediately upon passage of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964.8"' Both cases were argued and considered
together in that both attacked the constitutionality of Title II. In
Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States,' a three judge district
court sustained the validity of Title II as it applied to the Heart of
Atlanta Motel.' Almost at the same time, a three judge district
thereof as constitutes interstate commerce. The effective control of interstate
transportation will frequently require some regulation of... other activities
that may be closely related thereto or even inextricably interwoven therewith."
Ibid.
185. Camminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917).
186. In addition to Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241
(1964), and Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964), a third case, Hamm v.
City of Rock Hill, 379 U.S. 306 (1964), was also decided. Hamm is relevant to a
discussion of the public accommodations section and more extensive treatment can be
found in Note, Civil Disobedience in the Civil Rights Movement: To What Extent Pro-
tected and Sanctioned, 16 W. RES. L REV. 711 (1965).
187. 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
188. 231 F. Supp. 393 (N.D. Ga. 1964).
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court sitting in Birmingham, Alabama, declared Title II unconstitu-
tional in its application to Ollie's Barbecue located in Birming-
ham;"8 9 however, the Supreme Court reversed that case in Katzen-
bach v. McClung.9 Since the two cases arise from different facts
and are based on different subsections of Title II, they will be treated
separately.
(1) Heart of Atlanta Motel.-The Heart of Atlanta Motel is
located near interstate highways in Atlanta, Georgia. It advertises
nationally and accepts transient as well as local guests. The motel
has always followed a policy of refusing its facilities to Negroes.
Heart of Atlanta proceeded to attack Title II on three grounds:
(1) Congress exceeded its power under the commerce clause;
(2) Title II violates the fifth amendment in that it is a taking of
liberty and property without due process of law and without ade-
quate compensation; and (3) Congress, by requiring that Negroes
be accommodated against the appellant's will, violated the thirteenth
amendment in that appellant was subjected to involuntary servitude.
The appellees joined the issues arguing: (1) Congress had the
power to pass Title II under the commerce clause; (2) Title II rep-
resents reasonable regulation which is not forbidden by the fifth
amendment; and (3) the thirteenth amendment abolished slavery
and the appellent could not utilize it to reinstate a badge of for-
bidden slavery. The Court, as expected, upheld the decision of the
district court in all respects.
Initially, the Court ruled inapposite the Civil Rights Cases"'9 in
that the Civil Rights Act of 1875 broadly proscribed all discrimina-
tion under the aegis of the fourteenth amendment. That act was
much broader than the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and was declared
unconstitutional for that reason. But since the act of 1964 relies
upon the commerce clause as its source of authority, a decision ren-
dered on a broader piece of legislation and directed at the fourteenth
amendment could not be controlling precedent. The Court, after
disposing of questionable precedent, directed its attention to the basis
of the congressional action. The Court did not delve into the con-
gressional findings that discrimination constitutes a burden on com-
merce. This unusual judicial reticence may be traced to several fac-
tors. First, the Court was understandably reluctant to delve into
the legislative prerogative. Justice Clark confined his analysis to
189. 233 F. Supp. 815 (N.D. Ala. 1964).
190. 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
191. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
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summarizing the highlights 9 2 and concluded that the legislative
record proved conclusively that discrimination impedes interstate
travel.'93 Second, as noted above, it is not altogether necessary for
Congress to gather overwhelming economic data since the commerce
clause will support moral legislation, as for example, the Mann
White Slave Act.
The next consideration was directed at the nature of the con-
gressional power over interstate commerce. The Court quoted ex-
tensively from Gibbons v. Ogden' in seeking to define the word
"commerce." Mr. Justice Clark, writing for the majority, enunciated
a two-pronged test as derived from the Gibbons standards. The
"activity" sought to be regulated must concern more than one state
and it must bear a "substantial relation to the national interest."'9 5
In response to the first qualification, the Court noted that the
rule is long established that commerce includes the movement of
people from one state to another 9 . and that movement, in order to
be protected or regulated under the commerce clause, need not be
commercial in nature.9 7 Then the Court detailed action taken by
Congress under the authority of the commerce clause which had little
or no relation to commercial activity.' 8 The point of this documen-
tation is to point out that legislating against moral wrongs does not
weaken the validity of such action.'
The Court next considered whether the local operation of an
establishment could remove it from the purview of the clause and
hence blunt the application of Title II. This was rejected in favor
of the proposition that if interstate commerce is affected, it does not
matter how local the operation is; it will be subject to the act. °
Further, Justice Clark pointed out that the congressional history
clearly depicts the overall effect discrimination has upon interstate
commerce.
192. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 US.. 241 (1964).
193. Id. at 250.
194. 9Wheat 1 (1824).
195. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
196. Smith v. Turner, 7 How. 283 (1849).
197. Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.. 470 (1916). "Nor does it make any dif-
ference whether the transportation is commercial in character." Heart of Atlanta Motel,
Inc. v. United States, 379 U.. 241, 256 (1964).
198. For example, deceptive practices in the sale of products, FTC v. Mandel Bros.,
359 U.. 385 (1959); to professional football, Radovich v. National Football League,
352 U.S. 445 (1957); and gambling, Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321 (1903).
199. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 257 (1964).
200. See United States v. Women's Sportswear Mfg. Ass'n, 336 U.S. 460 (1949).
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Addressing itself to the appellant's second contention, that is,
that the fifth amendment prohibits the taking of property that al-
legedly occurs under Title II, the Court rejected that amendment's
applicability to this situation. It is noted in this respect that thirty-
two states have enacted public accommodation laws none of which
have ever been successfully attacked as taking property in violation
of the fourteenth amendment."°' As if to appease those who decry
Title II from an economic standpoint, the Court considered for a brief
moment the fact that it is highly unlikely that economic loss will
parallel integration of public accommodations and amusements.202
Then adding a parenthetical, Justice Clark stated that economic loss
is irrelevant anyway since loss by A member of a regulated class has
never been a barrier to legislation."' Having dispensed with the
main objections, Justice Clark, apparently tiring of the futile argu-
ments, discussed the remaining contentions concerning the fifth
amendment's applicability in an almost cavalier fashion. The prohi-
bition of discrimination in places of public accommodation does not
impair individual liberty;' °4 and there is no merit in the claim that
Title II takes property without compensation."'
The final argument concerning involuntary servitude is also
given short shrift. According to Justice Clark, the act only codifies
the long standing inn keeper rules 20 which pre-date the thirteenth
amendment, and as such the amendment cannot be used to contro-
vert the reason for its existence. The Court concludes by noting that
Congress has broad discretion to decide how obstructions to com-
201. According to the court's compendium, the following states have enacted public
accommodations laws. ALASKA STAT. ANN. §§ 11.60.230 to .240 (1962); CALIF.
CIv. CODE §§ 51-54 (1954); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 25-1-1 to -2-5 (1953);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-35 (1961); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, ch. 45 (1963);
IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 18-7301 to -7303 (1961); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 13-1 to
-4 (Smith-Hurd 1961); IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 10-901 to -914 (1961); IOWA CODE
ANN. §§ 735.1-.2 (1950); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 21-2424 (Supp. 1962); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 137, § 50 (1954); MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, § 11 (1964);
MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 140, §5 5, 8 (1957); MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 28.343-.344
(1962); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 327.09 (1947); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. tit. 64, §
211 (1962); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 20, §§ 101, 102 (1954); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. ch. 354, §§ 1, 2, 4, 5 (1963); N.J. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 1-2 to -7; tit. 18, §
25-1 to -6 (1963); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 49-8-1 to -6 (1963); N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS, art.
4, §§ 40, 41; N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-22-30 (1963); OHIO REV. CODE §§ 2901.35-
.36; ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 30.670, 30.675, 30.680 (1963); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §
4654 (1963); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. 55 11-24-1 to -6 (1956); S.D. SEss. LAws
1963, ch. 58; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, 55 1451, 1452 (1958); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. §§ 49.60.010-.170, 9, 91. 010 (1962); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 942.04 (1958);
WYO. STAT. ANN. 5§ 6-83.1, 6-83.2 (1963).
202. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
203. See Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503, 518 (1944).
204. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 260 (1964).
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merce may be removed. And it is subject only to the "caveat" that
the means Congress selects must be reasonably ordered to a con-
situtional end.2"'
D. Katzenbach v. McClung2°8
The district court in McClung declared Title II unconstitutional
as applied to Ollie's Barbecue.20' This action was taken because the
court determined that Congress had exceeded its power under the
commerce clause by creating a conclusive presumption that a restau-
rant affects commerce if it purchases a substantial portion of food
from interstate sources or offers to serve interstate commerce.
Ollie's Barbecue is a family owned restaurant in Birmingham
located some distance from an interstate highway. It followed a
practice of discriminating against Negroes. In the year preceding
this case, Ollie's Barbecue purchased approximately 46 per cent of
its total food stuffs from a local dealer who purchased from inter-
state sources.
In reversing the district court, the Supreme Court relied on the
Heart of Atlanta case for a major portion of its reasoning. But
it must be recalled that this case is brought under a different
subsection of the act - 201(b) (2).10 Ollie's Barbecue may be
included within Title II if either of two facts are present: (1) it
serves or offers to serve interstate travelers; or (2) it purchases a
substantial portion of food from interstate sources. The former, by
stipulation or neglect, was not considered in this case; only the
latter is subjected to judicial scrutiny. The government argued
that Ollie's Barbecue purchased a substantial portion of food from
sources without Alabama and thus application of the act is im-
posed in this situation. Thus Ollie's Barbecue, by its participation
in the total effect of discrimination, has imposed "commercial bur-
dens of national magnitude upon interstate commerce."211  The
205. Id. at 261.
206. Ibid. As will be noted below, the Court is guilty of a broad oversimplification
when it states that public accommodation laws merely codify the common law inn keeper
rule. At best that rule would serve as a basis of section 201(b) (1) relating to lodg-
ing, 78 Star. 243, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000a(b) (1) (1964). The other sections hardly
find a source in that rule.
207. Id. at 261-62.
208. 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
209. 233 F. Supp. 815 (N.D. Ala. 1964).
210. 78 Star. 243, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000a(b) (2) (1964).
211. Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 299 (1964).
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appellee, however, took issue with the connection between out-of-
state purchases and consequent burdens on commerce.
The Court reasoned that in the congressional investigations the
determination was made that racial discrimination in restaurants
resulted in a considerable loss of the Negro dollar for on-the-
premises spending.21 The fact of this lessened spending adversely
affects interstate commerce.1 "The fewer customers a restaurant
enjoys the less food it sells and consequently the less it buys."2 4  It
must be admitted that the failure of Ollie's Barbecue to purchase
more foodstuffs to serve more people has a less than de minimus
effect on the national economy; however when that reduced spend-
ing is multiplied by many restaurants in many cities across the
nation, the total effect is a little more than the proverbial "drop
in the bucket." In addition to economic loss, the restaurant policies
in certain areas have a marked effect on interstate travel." 5 The
Court utilized this argument in reaching the conclusion that the
district court erred in holding that there was no relationship be-
tween discriminatory practices in restaurants and interstate com-
merce. Here the Court considered the extent of congressional
power to regulate essentially local activities. On the authority of
Wickard v. Filburn,18 Justice Clark contended that no matter how
local the activity, it can be regulated by Congress under the com-
merce clause if the activity exerts a substantial economic effect on
interstate commerce.217 Only those activities which are wholly
218local are exempt from regulation under the commerce clause.
But the Court, nevertheless, considered that Ollie's Barbecue, because
of its interstate purchases, substantially affects interstate commerce.
The appellees in this case argued that the conclusive presump-
tion of coverage is wrong and they would substitute a case by case
determination of applicability. Justice Clark answered that the
Court is foreclosed from investigation into each case when Congress
has adopted a rational schema for regulation of particular activi-
212. For a chart illustrating the spending differentials between white and Negro, see
BUREAU OF NAT'L AFFAIRS, THE CIVIL RIGHTS Acr OF 1964, at 266 (1964).
213. Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 300 (1964).
214. Id. at 299.
215. U.S.CoDE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1741-42 (July 20, 1964).
216. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
217. Although Justice Clark uses the words economic effect, it is not to be taken as
being a sine qua non of regulation, for as pointed out in the Heart of Atlanta case, regu-
lation may be based on moral grounds as well.
218. Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 302 (1964), citing Gibbons v. Ogden,
9 Wheat. 1, 195 (1824).
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ties."' The attitude taken by the majority in summing up both
cases is revealing.
The power of Congress in this field is broad and sweeping; where
it keeps within its sphere and violates no express constitutional
limitation it has been the rule of this Court, going back almost
to the founding days of the republic not to interfere.220
E. Concurring Opinions
Justices Black, Douglas, and Goldberg appended separate con-
curring opinions to the Heart of Atlanta case. Those opinions
will be briefly considered for their contrasted reasoning.
Justice Black seemed to express his opinion in order to demon-
strate a broader base for sustaining the validity of the measure.
He noted that the necessary and proper clause,22' when added
to the commerce clause, extends to Congress the power to regulate
strictly local activities within a single state if those activities affect
the flow of commerce."2 Also, Justice Black analogized this case
to the Shreveport22 case where the Court recognized that Congress
has full power to regulate wholly intrastate activity if that intra-
state activity would exert a harmful effect on interstate commerce.
Thus, Congress may, under its authority to foster and regulate inter-
state commerce, do that which it could not do directly. 24 However,
Justice Black warned that the essential distinction between purely
local and that which is interstate commerce ought to be preserved.
2 5
Thus not every remote discriminatory act should be a justification
for calling into play the immense power Congress possesses. Hark-
ing back to the principles enunciated by Marshall in McCulloch
-v. Maryland,"' Justice Black concluded that if the end is legitimate,
the means are appropriate, Congress is not prohibited by the Con-
stitution elsewhere, the action is within the scope of the commerce
and necessary powers clauses.2
219. Id. at 303-04.
220. Id. at 305.
221. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 3, cl. 18.
222. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 271 (1964) (con-
curring opinion).
223. 234 U.S. 342 (1914).
224. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 272 (1964) (con-
curring opinion).
225. Id. at 275.
226. 4 Wheat 316 (1819).
227. Justice Black also considers and rejects the motel and restaurant owners' argu-
ments based on the fifth and thirteenth amendments. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v.
United States, 379 U.S. 241, 277-78 (1964) (concurring opinion).
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Justice Douglas expressed his disappointment with the ma-
jority opinion because it rested solely on the commerce clause.228
He is quick to point out that his dissatisfaction does not lie in
any belief that the commerce clause is inadequate to the task but
that it is unfortunate to group cattle, fruit, steel, and coal with basic
human rights. Justice Douglas would much prefer to sustain the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 on the fifth section of the fourteenth
amendment.
The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legisla-
tion, the provisions of this article.229
This preference for the fourteenth amendment arises from a con-
viction that the section affords a more permanent and settling solu-
tion. This section would, in his view, drastically reduce obstruction-
ist activities designed to reduce the effect of the act. Briefly and
without due regard for the intricacies of Justice Douglas' position,
the fourteenth amendment would prohibit state enforcement of
trespass laws that are designated to perpetuate discrimination. An
additional reason for favoring that amendment's usage is that the
act prohibits state-supported discrimination.3 °
Justice Goldberg writes his concurring opinion for a two-
fold reason.231 First, he wishes to underscore the fact that the act is
not a congressional plan for elevating the nation's economy, but is
designed to vindicate human rights. Second, he agrees with Justice
Douglas in that the commerce clause and the fourteenth amend-
ment serve as the underpinnings of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
VII. PRIVATE PROPERTY AND TITLE II
Having attempted to resolve the meaning of the act and inter-
pret the cases thereunder, it is appropriate to answer the oft-heard
lay critique of the act: "It is my property - why can't I do with
it as I please?" The phrase is repeated so often and with so much
conviction that the issue of private property versus public accommo-
dations minimizes the other arguments both pro-and con. And, until
the question is satisfactorily resolved to a reasonable degree, even
the normally fair-minded person will be grudging in his acceptance
of Title II. The thesis of this portion of the Note is, simply, that
228. Id. at 279.
229. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, 5 5.
230. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 282-83 (1964)
(concurring opinion).
231. Id. at 291-93.
[Vol. 16:660
Public Accommodations
while the right to acquire and hold property is a natural right,
despotic control of use has never been a basic tenet of that right.
A. Historically
To the primitive nomadic people of the earth private property,
except for personal belongings, was unknown.232 In fact, common
practice demanded that necessities be shared equally among other
members of the tribe.233 Communism was practiced to a very high
degree. But as the dusk of primitive society gave way to the dawn
of civilization men began to acquire property and hold it for them-
selves. Durant advances the thesis that civilization required industry,
and a communistic way of life was ill-suited to personal achievement,
industry and thrift.234 And, as agriculture displaced hunting as a
way of life, private interest in realty arose simply because no man
was about to share the fruits of his labor with a fellow who refused
to plant and work. Prior to this period, economic production was
satisfactorily ensured by requiring the participation of tribal groups.
But the decline of nomadic movement gave way to a developing
agricultural economy which made the family the most efficient unit
of production. And since the family needed a home and if the earth
was good, the interloper became the settler. As the family devel-
oped and civilization grew, private ownership of land became the
rule. When the young grew and looked for land of their own, they
pushed out old boundaries and reclaimed the forest, jungle, and
marsh. Such land was carefully guarded as belonging to the re-
claimer. Society recognized this right thus giving impetus to further
development.235 This organizational phenomenon spread rapidly
throughout the early civilizations. And by the time of the Egyptian
Fifth Dynasty the law of private property was highly developed.3 '
Private property was also the core of the early Jewish economy.237
In other words, the concept of private property is by no means of
recent vintage. Unfortunately, the historical entrenchment of this
concept has contributed to a calcification of an absolute principle
without proper regard for the philosophical refinements that miti-
gate it. Historically and philosophically, the principle of private
232. 1 DURANT, THE STORY OF CIVLIZATON 16-20 (1954).
233. Ibid.
234. Id. at 18.
235. Id. at 19.
236. Id. at 161.
237. Id. at 336-37. Durant contends that the Eighth Commandment sanctified pri-
vate property in the Jewish religion.
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ownership has not been absolute in every respect. But, as is true
with all matters that touch the pocketbook, concepts are interpreted
to the benefit of the interpreter. And, despite self-serving interpre-
tations, no major social philosopher or legal scholar has declared
the right to private property absolute in all respects. All have rec-
ognized that the privilege or right to ownership is equally burdened
with social responsibilities.
Blackstone is erroneously credited as being the principal expo-
nent of absolutism with respect to property. This interpretation of
the venerable legal thinker's considerations on the nature of private
property is due to incomplete scholarship. Those who cite Black-
stone allude to his statement that the ownership of private property
consists in the "sole and despotic dominion which one man claims
and exercises over the external things of the world, in total exclusion
of the right of any other individual in the universe."" 8  Neverthe-
less, the Commentaries are replete with what seems to be obvious
inconsistencies. At one point, Blackstone so underscores the basic
right to property that he states that even the greatest good of the
entire community would not authorize the least violation of that
right." 9 But while expressing these thoughts, Blackstone also says,
obliquely, that property cannot be taken without adequate compen-
sation. Of course, this implies that the state can take property so
long as the compensation is just. Also, he recognized and affirmed
the common law obligation of the inn keeper to accept all who seek
accommodation.2 ' These concessions are not consistent with claims
of despotic control. In defense of his position, it is entirely possible
that Blackstone recognized an unspoken distinction between the right
to own private property and the right to use private property.
Essentially, there are two basic philosophies respecting the na-
ture of private property. One view contends that private ownership
stems from societal recognition. Apologists for this view would ad-
here to the principle that what the state gives the state may take
away. Thus, no problem is encountered in considering Title II, since
if the government bestows upon its citizens the right of possession,
it may, ipso facto, delimit that right or even abolish it altogether. On
the other hand, there is an equally recognized viewpoint that the
right to private property stems ultimately from the nature and needs
238. 1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 329 (Cooley's
ed. 1871). (Emphasis added.)
239. Id. at 129-39.
240. Ibid.
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of man and as such cannot be compromised by the state. Nonetheless,
devotees of this doctrine would impart an obligation on all owners
of property to use that property in such a manner as not to offend
or injure the common good. In either of these views, there seems
to be no room for one who argues that Title II deprives or intrudes
illegitimately upon the right of private ownership.
B. Property as Co-extensive with the State
Jeremy Bentham, for example, regarded the right to property as
co-equal.with its recognition by the state. It was his thesis that prop-
erty and law come into being simultaneously and before laws were
made, property did not exist.24' Therefore, since private property
exists at the pleasure of the state, the state can expand the burdens of
ownership. 2 2  Walter Lippman has expressed similar views noting
that it is error to regard the existing law of property as delineating
an area in which the state may not enter.243 He contends that the
law of property developed by laissez-faire theorists ignores the fact
that title to property is a mere construction of law not unlike a con-
tract or corporation. 44  And that title is "a structure of rights and
duties, immunities and privileges, built by custom, judicial interpre-
tation, and statute, and maintained by the coercive authority of the
state."2
45
It is readily apparent that under this view the-owner of the Heart
of Atlanta Motel cannot effectively argue that his right to private
property is being infringed upon when he is required to accept
Negro registrants. If his right to ownership depends upon the state,
the state may logically restrict ownership and use. But even under
a more absolute view of property, the motel operator does not fare
any better - but for a different reason.
C. Property Rights before the State
The Scholastic approach to private property is two-fold. Man's
right to ownership is derived from the natural law. By virtue of
241. BENTHAM, THIE THEORY OF LEGISLATION 111-13 (London ed. 1931).
242. See also Cohen, Dialogue on Private Property, 9 RUTGERs L REV. 357 (1954).
Cohen posits the state as a party whose presence and acquiescence is necessary to create
a property right.
243. LIPPMAN, THE GOOD SOCmTY, The Rule of Law and Regulation of Property
354 (1937).
244. Id. at 351-52.
245. Id. at 354. Mr. Lippman seems to develop this viewpoint not so much out of a
genuine belief that property is dependent upon the favor of the state, but it was, in
1937, much easier to justify New Deal legislation by ignoring the problem rather than
grappling with age old doctrines.
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man's reason and free will - possessed by none other - he has do-
minion over the earth.246 However, the right to private property
is not a right derived directly from nature in the sense that common
dominion by man is achieved. If this were the case, justice would
be violated if each man did not own a piece of land. Yet, according
to Thomas Aquinas, the institution of private property is so neces-
sary to peace, order and prosperity that without it the economic
order would suffer.247  Thus, the institution of property is a creature
of the jus gentium and more immitigable than positive law since
man's basic needs require it. Nonetheless, as part of the jus gen-
tium, it is subject to modification as man's customs require.
Thomas argues that with respect to the things of the earth,
man must possess property and secondly use that property. Now
insofar as possession is concerned, it is necessary for three reasons.
First, man strives harder and contributes more to the community
in general if he works to procure for himself and his family as
opposed to working for goods which would be common to all.248
Second, human affairs are conducted in a more orderly fashion when
each man is charged with caring for particular things, whereas dis-
order would prevail if everyone had indeterminate chores.249 Third,
a more peaceful state is ensured when each man possesses what he
owns and owns what he possesses. Thomas believed that quarrels
arise more frequently when there is no division of things pos-
sessed.250
With respect to the use of external things, Thomas taught that,
although each man ought to own property, he ought to own it in
such a manner as to be able to communicate it to others in their
need.2 ' Therefore, it seems that while individual ownership is an
absolute right, its use is encumbered by social obligations. These
social obligations are derived according to Thomas Aquinas, from
two distinct sources: (1) the common good; and (2) divine and
246. CRONIN, CATHOLIC SOCIAL PRINCIPLES 477 (1955).
247. Ibid.
248. ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, II-II, Q.66, ad. 2. This point
seems to be well-taken in that the Soviet system is undergoing a minor revolution in
an attempt to provide the workers with profit incentives. Without individual in-
centives, workers in a communist state do not perform at a level of efficiency compar-
able to workers in a free enterprise system.
249. Ibid.
250. Ibid.
251. Ibid. The point of this organization is that man in a state of innocence would
have the altruism necessary for common ownership. CRONIN, op. cit. supra note 246,
at 480.
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human positive law. It is to the latter that attention is directed.
In the scheme of ordered rights and consequent obligations, the
state, in the absence of natural or divine law, may ascribe to
property certain social obligations. The sole restriction on the
state's right to legislate social obligations is that government
must take care not to destroy private ownership under the guise of
taxation or regulation.252 As a guideline, Thomas stated that the
social aspect of property increases as it affects other individuals.
Those possessions which do not normally affect other individuals
should not be state regulated. However, as those possessions be-
came affected with greater social impact, the state's right to regulate
becomes clear.25 This concept is not entirely foreign to the com-
mon law. Riparian rights are jealously guarded and the right to
despoil the water upstream, even though that portion belongs to
the owner, is abridged by the state. The same is true with respect
to public accommodations. Mrs. Murphy's boarding house, without
much importance to society, is not regulated and properly so. But
a motel with 216 rooms" imports a greater effect on s6ciety than
a five room boarding house. And that effect is significant enough
to be regulated by positive law. Thus, according to the Scholastic
viewpoint, Title II of the Civil Rights Act is entirely consistent
with the nature of private property and that legislation is simply
the result of positive law defining social obligations.
Locke, is perhaps, more adamant in his approach to private
property.255 He was convinced that man's possession of and
right to private property preceded the formation of govern-
ment.' This right is derived from man's labor with respect to a
certain piece of property. That is, when a man toils in the field,
he has mixed his labor with that field and given that field some-
thing of himself. "It being by him removed from the common
state nature placed it in, it hath by this labour something annexed
to it that excludes the common right of other men." '257 In order
to ensure that a superior force would not rob man of his property,
man decided, according to Locke, to enter into a relationship with a
community whereby the united strength of all would secure property
252. CRONiN, op. cit. supra note 246, at 483.
253. Id. at 484.
254. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
255. LocKE, II or CIVIL GOVERNMENT, of Property 129 (Rhys ed. 1924). See
PI1NEHART, MAN AND TmE STATE 327 (Ebenstein ed. 1948).
256. Ibid.
257. Id. at 130.
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rights.25 And Locke argues that the legislative power cannot de-
feat what was possessed in a state of nature.259 This is so since pro-
tection of property was a condition precedent of entry into society.
If society performs an act which would lessen that property right,
the owner ought to first give his consent.26 ° But Locke does seem
to provide for a taking by a legislative body that is truly representa-
tive of the people governed.26' Also, it seems that Locke would
not object to reasonable regulation of property for he warns only
against an arbitrary use of power by a legislature.262
John Stuart Mill declares that no exclusive right should be granted
to individuals in land unless that right is productive of positive good.
In a persuading fashion, he argues that the rights flowing from pri-
vate property are coextensive with the purpose or reason for private
property."' And these rights go no further than the purpose for
them. In this context, the primary reason for operating a place of
public accommodation is profit. The rights flowing from that pur-
pose do not extend to accepting or rejecting Negro applicants. It
has not yet been demonstrated that the integration of public accom-
modations results in a decline in business. In fact, the converse is
true. For instance, the Dallas Chamber of Commerce manager
stated that "this year we've probably added $8 to $10 million of fu-
ture bookings because we're integrated."'264
In summary, no major social philosopher adheres rigidly to an
absolutist viewpoint with respect to the use of private property.
While there is a considerable difference of opinion regarding the
right to private property, there is little difference regarding the right
of use. In this respect the consensus of opinion clearly demonstrates
that the right to use private property is impressed with a societal in-
258. Id. at 186.
259. Ibid.
260. Id. at 187.
261. Id. at 189.
262. Id. at 184.
263. MILL, SOCIALIsM 56 (Bliss ed. 1891).
264. U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1743 (July 20, 1964). (Emphasis added.)
Atlanta, Georgia experienced an increase in convention guests within one day after
Atlanta hotels announced an integrated policy. Ibid. The opponents of the measure
contend that "a host follows the customs of his community else he suffers, economically.
To force him to abandon his practice, to run counter to prevailing opinion, is to injure
his business and his property. He does not, and he cannot, set custom. He follows it
or suffers." Id. at 1813. Unfortunately, as is the case with many opponents of the
bill, generalities abound. There are no facts available relating integration to a decline
in business.
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terest. It is fair to conclude, therefore, that Title II does not infringe
upon those vested rights.
VIII. THE IMPACT OF TITLE II ON STATE PUBLIC
ACCOMMODATION LAWS
Initially, any discussion of the impact of Title I on existing state
laws is necessarily limited to those states having public accommoda-
tion laws. Of course, those states which have laws designed to pro-
mote segregation will lose control of their local situations. On the
other hand, states with public accommodation laws will not com-
pletely lose control over racial discrimination in their own states.
But whether control is fully maintained on a local level will depend
on the state statute as well as the attitude of local law enforcement
agencies. At this point, it would be redundant to re-define the
"state's rights" safeguard built into the act in section 204(c) and
(d) ; -this has been discussed fully.2"6  It would be helpful, how-
ever, to contrast a typical state statute with the act.
A. The Ohio Public Accommodations Statute
The Ohio statute enumerates as places of public accommodation
inns, restaurants, barber shops, public transportation, theaters, and
retail establishments.267 The statute provides specifically that the
enumerated list is not exclusive. The principle of ejusdem generis
has been applied to the statute in order to bring within its purview,
among other establishments, an ice cream parlor1 8 and an amuse-
ment park."6 ' The Civil Rights Act of 1964 is not as detailed as
the Ohio statute and the principle of ejusdem generis would not
seem generally applicable. It should be noted, nevertheless, that un-
der certain circumstances the act would cover all establishments
named in the Ohio statute. Section 201 (b)(4)270 provides that if
an establishment is located within the premises of a named establish-
ment, or vice-versa, it too will be covered. In this regard, a barber-
shop or beauty salon would, if located in a transient hotel, be within
265. 78 Star. 244, 42 U.S.C.A. 5§ 2000a-3(c) (d) (1964).
266. See text at pp. 686-88 supra.
267. OHio Rnv. CODE § 2901.35.
268. Fowler v. Benner, 13 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 313 (C.P. 1912). Contra, Deuwell
v. Foerster, 12 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 329 (C.P. 1912).
269. Johnson v. Humphrey Pop Corn Co., 4 Ohio C.C.R. (n.s.) 49 (C.C. 1902),
afI'd, 70 Ohio St. 478, 72 N.E. 1160 (1904); Guy v. The Tri-State Amusement Co., 7
Ohio App. 509 (1917).
270. 78 Stat. 243, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000a(b) (4) (1964).
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the act. But no technicalities of this nature encumber the Ohio law.
No matter where a barbershop is located in Ohio, it is within the
statute. Thus, as the statute is drawn, federal intervention in Ohio
would not seem to be probable.
B. Conflicting Court Decisions
The real difficulty in maintaining local control centers about
judicial construction of state statutes; unfortunately, decisions in
this area are quite dated. Perhaps the lack of current disputes in
Ohio stands as silent attestation to two unrelated factors. Initially,
it could be fairly concluded, from common experience, that Negroes
are reluctant to enter white personal service establishments such as
barber shops or beauty salons. Secondly, Negroes have patronized
theaters, restaurants, amusement parks, and public conveyances, in
some locales, to such an extent that their presence is unnoted.
However, when Negroes move beyond customary habitats, resent-
ment still greets the prospect of their patronage.
In Harvey, Inc. v. Sissle,27' for example, the court decided sua
sponte, that retail establishments selling wearing apparel to women
are not within the statute. The court, in an irrelevant non-sequitur,
indulged in the following judicial fairy tale.
In olden times we were taught that the right of private contract
was a constitutional guaranty. If a farmer had grain or cattle to
sell or a manufacturer had machinery to sell, or a merchant had
merchandise to sell, we were told that he could sell it whenever,
to whomsoever, and upon whatever terms he chose. He could
refuse to sell to a German, Irishman, Negro, Jew or any other
person for any or no reason.2 72
On the basis of the foregoing opinion, it would not be difficult to
envisage federal intervention if the case indicated Ohio's position. But
to illustrate the conflict, contrast Sissle with The Puritan Lunch Co. v.
FormanY3  In Forman, the court regarded separate accommoda-
tions in a restaurant as violative of the statute. In a remarkably
enlightened opinion, the court274 condemned discrimination of all
forms. And the court summarized the purpose of the Ohio statute in
the following manner.
271. 53 Ohio App. 405, 5 N.E.2d 410 (1936).
272. Id. at 408-09, 5 N.E.2d at 411. (Emphasis added.)
273. 29 Ohio Ct. App. 289 (1918).
274. Both the court in Sissle and the court in Formn were courts of common pleas.
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Its purpose was to contradict the pitiless affront to .a being created
in the image of a common and impartial Maker, embodied in the
rather coarse but still accurate translation which a large and influ-
ential section of the country made of Judge Taney's dictum - *A
nigger ain't a man.' The unthoughtful design, the perhaps un-
conscious purpose, of this discrimination - and certainly its effect
- is to constantly remind the black man that his is an inferior
race, whereas our constitutions, our legislation, our avowed public
policy, all say it is an equal race in the eye of the law.275
This dichotomy of result and philosophy is effused throughout state
judicial pronouncements in the area of public accommodations. Un-
less the resolution of these conflicting decisions is harmonized with
the temper of the day, federal intervention via Title II is a certainty.
IX. CONCLUSION
The total effect of Title II is not as broad as was hoped for nor
as broad as was feared. Substantially, the act leaves untouched
vast areas of local business. But it does extend to a large segment
of accommodations and amusements that, but for the act, would
still be following a course of discrimination. Now a hungry and
tired Negro may stop traveling when his needs demand, not when
the locale dictates. The cold hand of rebuff has been lowered, but
probably to be replaced by an unfortunate but tolerable glower.
Ignorance cannot be legislated away. Tolerance cannot be embued
by congressional action. And, Negroes cannot be insulated from
insult. Nevertheless, the soul-searing reaction to prejudice can be
eased. Perhaps years of reluctant obedience will eventually give way
to a national attitude more compatible with this nation's professed
standards.
Happily, the civil disobedience and the beatings related to
public accommodations are well-nigh over. Now the cause seekers
can move on to more fertile areas such as voting rights, employment
and housing. Equally appreciated will be the demise of the "red-
necked" bully more than anxious to take advantage of peaceful pro-
test. Perhaps a measure of the violence can be relegated to the
limbo of forgotten history.
Unfortunately, the act leaves a gray area of confusion that must
be judicially resolved before all concerned will be fully apprised
275. The Puritan Lunch Co. v. Forman, 29 Ohio Ct. App. 289, 298 (1918).
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of the standards governing application of the act. There are also
portions of the act that can be construed to severely delimit the
effectiveness of the act as well as areas that can be expanded be-
yond reasonably justifiable limitations. It is indeed distressing that
states are not better able to cope with what is essentially a local
problem. Perhaps the fear of federal intervention will adduce a
favorable response from local political institutions. In any event,
the worth or failure of the act will be apparent before half a decade
has elapsed.
HARRY T. QUICK
